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ABSTRACT
COMPUTER FORENSICS METHODOLOGY AND PRAXIS
Robin C. Morrison
28 July 2006
This thesis lays the groundwork for creation of a 
graduate-level computer forensics course.  It begins with 
an introduction explaining how computing has invaded modern 
life and explains what computer forensics is and its 
necessity.  The thesis then argues why universities need to 
be at the forefront of educating students in the science of 
computer forensics as opposed to proprietary education 
courses and the benefits to law enforcement agencies of 
having a computer scientist perform forensic analyses. It 
continues to detail what computer forensics is and is not. 
The thesis then addresses legal issues and the motivation 
for the topic.  Following this section is a review of 
current literature pertaining to the topic.  The last half 
of the thesis lays a groundwork for design of a computer 
forensics course at the graduate level by detailing a 
methodology to implement which contains associated 
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Computing in Modern Life
Computers have permeated almost every aspect of modern 
life.  Their benefits are innumerable.  Computers have 
automated manufacturing processes, sped delivery of goods, 
enhanced shopping options, made cross-planetary 
communications virtually instant, and even saved lives 
through online sharing of medical information.  Information 
is much more easily accessible than in the not-so-distant 
past and has reduced research time and travel immensely. 
However, with the rise in the benefits of computing has 
come the rise of the darker side of computing.  In Taoist 
philosophy, this would be represented by the yin-yang 
symbol.  
Unfortunately, criminals have benefited from 
technological advancements in computing.  Computers have 
made it much easier to steal trade secrets from companies 
and have even caused grave threats to national security. 
Since global communications are controlled by computers, 
they can also be disrupted by computers.  Law Enforcement 
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has a much more difficult time catching illegal bookmakers 
because in the past, the bookmakers would have volumes of 
paper with clients and bets, but now this information can 
easily be stored and hidden on removable media.  Organized 
crime does not have to keep large accounting registries of 
their activities.  They merely need an electronic 
spreadsheet and relational databases.  In fact, one of the 
fastest growing crimes, identity theft, was not nearly as 
common before the advent of the Internet boom of the mid-
1990s.  For as long as there will be computers, there will 
be people and organizations that use them in criminal 
activities.  
Computers can also be used in civil disputes.  A woman 
divorcing her husband for his infidelities may have proof 
of his relationships from their home computer.  A company 
being sued for wrongful termination by a former employee 
may base their defense on the employee's misuse of their 
computer systems.  A person being sued by the Recording 
Industry Association of America (R.I.A.A.) may be able to 
verify his or her claims of innocence by the information 
stored on their computer.  
There is a common thread binding these scenarios 
together:  the ability to extract digital information from 
computer media and the ability to present it in a useful 
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form in a court of law.  This method of investigation is 
known as computer forensics.  
Why Computer Forensics?
Is computer forensics a necessary field in the 
Information Age?  Although not a focal point of the overall 
reporting, several high profile news stories this decade 
have shown computer forensics to have played a major part 
in investigations.  A woman by the name of Chondra Levy, 
who was an intern for California Congressman Gary Condit, 
disappeared seemingly without a trace.  In the year 2000, 
the police forensically examined the information stored on 
her computer.  From the information gained, they were led 
to search a local park near her home where they found her 
remains.  
In 2001, the Enron scandal broke.  By forensically 
analyzing computers owned by the corporation, federal 
investigators were able to assess the large scope of the 
crimes committed by the leaders of the company and secure 
many convictions.  In conjunction with the criminal 
investigation of the activities at Enron, many civil 
lawsuits against the corporation have begun.  
In December 2004, a Kansas woman brutally murdered a 
Missouri woman, cutting her unborn baby out of her body and 
taking the living child with her.  Law Enforcement 
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forensically analyzed the computers of both victim and 
perpetrator and concluded that they had known each other 
and that this escalated from a case of a random act of 
violence into a case of premeditated murder.  Without a 
doubt, computer forensics has proven itself to be a vital 
discipline in these cases.  In addition to these very 
dramatic examples, there are many more lower profile cases 
on a daily basis that warrant the use of computer forensics 
in their investigations.  
Why Lab-Based Instruction in Computer Forensics?
Why is there a need for lab-based computer forensics 
training?  I have spent the last six years of my life 
teaching various aspects of computing at a proprietary 
technical college.  I have learned from experience, and 
many studies support my claim, that the best way to learn a 
computing skill is hands-on training in a laboratory 
environment.  Unfortunately, most major colleges and 
universities do not actively support this model.  The 
traditional classroom teaching found there, in my opinion, 
only gives students a theoretical, surface knowledge of the 
information being conveyed.  It is then up to the students 
themselves, if interested, to conduct experiments relating 
to the topics from the classroom.  Unfortunately, without 
adequate methodologies, supervision, and equipment these 
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experiments could lead students to form false assumptions 
and conclusions.  
In my experience as an instructor, I have experimented 
with many different teaching methodologies.  By mixing and 
matching different techniques, I have settled on a 
methodology that seems to benefit the most types of 
students, addressing a variety of learning styles.  It 
heavily involves laboratory-based curricula.  Over 80% of 
the teaching and learning is done in a laboratory 
environment.  The other 20% of learning is done in 
traditional theory sessions alternating between Microsoft 
Power-Point style slide shows, video presentations, and the 
traditional writing board.  
In the laboratory environment, approximately 60% of the 
learning is accomplished through instructor-led, hands-on 
learning and experimentation.  Approximately 20% of the 
learning is done with guided experiments showing the 
students step-by-step how to accomplish the learning 
objectives set before them.  The final 20% is 
experimentation in which the student is required to apply 
the skills already learned with minimal guidance from the 
instructor.
Since computer forensics is an extremely hands-on and 
intensive discipline, I believe the most effective method 
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of learning will be the aforementioned method.  I am a 
staunch proponent of learning-by-doing.  A student cannot 
master a skill by only theoretically learning about the 
topic.  They must be able to apply this knowledge, be able 
to apply it correctly, and base effective conclusions on 
their solid methodology.
Why Graduate Level University Instruction?
Training in computer forensics usually occurs in two 
areas:  Law Enforcement and proprietary training.  Law 
Enforcement personnel can receive their training at low or 
no cost through the National White Collar Crime Commission 
(NW3C).  Training for Law Enforcement can also be received 
from New Technologies International (NTI) for a fee.  For 
the average civilian, the training can be provided, for a 
large fee, by companies that focus on computer forensics. 
Digital Intelligence, Guidance Software, Paraben, Forensic-
Computers, and NTI are some of the companies that provide 
such training.
Unfortunately, the average college student who has 
decided to focus his or her graduate studies on Information 
Security cannot afford these expensive training courses. 
Therefore, training needs to be given at the graduate level 
in a non-proprietary format to equip students with the 
necessary investigative skills to ensure competence in the 
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field upon graduation.  It should allow for easy transition 
into the corporate world with possibly a junior position in 
a consulting firm or maybe an entry-level learning position 
in a major company with its own forensics department.
The university would be an ideal place to train 
students in the art and science of computer forensics. 
Unlike proprietary courses, which generally last only three 
to five days, usually eight hours per day, the courses at 
the university can last up to fifteen weeks with up to 
three hours of classroom learning spread over two or three 
days per week.  There is less of a time crunch for students 
to learn at the university and more time for 
experimentation.  Also, the university can provide much 
more lab time outside of the classroom for students to 
learn, whereas proprietary training usually does not allow 
for out of class learning at their facilities.  I have 
personally attended a proprietary training course and 
although it was very good, I could have learned more in-
depth if I had been allowed to experiment and learn from 
hands-on practice outside of normal training hours.  This 
is an area in which university training could excel with 
more attention paid to this matter.
I believe computer forensics training should be 
reserved for the graduate level only.  During undergraduate 
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studies, students are supposed to experience an abundance 
of Computer Science or Information Technology fields.  This 
is to allow the students to determine if they want to 
continue their studies in graduate school with focus on one 
field of specialty.  I believe computer forensics to be too 
narrow of a field to be offered in the vast array of 
baccalaureate courses.  This discipline is highly 
specialized and would be valid in an overall Information 
Security focus in graduate studies.  I prefer an 
undergraduate level course in Information/Computer Security 
that may briefly expose students to computer forensics, but 
not a specialized course at that level.
My major reason for championing university training is 
to put more computer forensic analysts in the field with 
backgrounds in computing.  In my discussions with high-
ranking employees of firms providing the proprietary 
training, I have been informed that most of the people 
attending these training courses are from backgrounds in 
law enforcement or are currently law enforcement officers. 
In the course I attended, I was the only student not 
currently serving in a law enforcement capacity.  
The problem I see with this is that most of the 
forensic analysis of computers is not being done by those 
who have intimate knowledge of computing systems.  Unless 
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these people have studied computer science, I do not 
believe their knowledge is complete enough to perform 
thorough forensic analysis.  Simple anomalies in a system 
under analysis that may go undetected by the law 
enforcement officer could possibly be easily detected by 
the Computer Science trained investigator.  Do not mistake 
my words.  I fully believe most computer forensic analysts 
in law enforcement do an excellent job.  But, I am of the 
opinion that someone whose background is in Computer 
Science or Information Technology would make a better 
analyst.  I believe that taking someone whose background is 
in computing and teaching them the principles of 
investigation from a law enforcement perspective is easier 
and more beneficial than taking someone whose background is 




What is Computer Forensics?
The term "computer forensics" was coined in 1991 in the 
first training session held by the International 
Association of Computer Specialists (IACIS) in Portland, 
Oregon [Marcella et al., 317].  Computer forensics is the 
science of acquiring, retrieving, preserving, and 
presenting data that has been processed electronically and 
stored on computer media [Schweitzer, 2].  It is "about 
evidence from computers that is sufficiently reliable to 
stand up in court and be convincing" [Vacca, 3].  
History of Computer Forensics - Historical Computer Crime
To examine the history of computer forensics, we must 
first examine the history of computer crime.  The art of 
"phreaking", that is exploring the international telephone 
systems and stealing service, is said to have originated at 
the University of California at Berkeley in the early 
1970s.  John T. Draper earned the moniker "Captain Crunch" 
when he found out that a toy whistle given away in a box of 
the cereal produced a 2600 Hertz tone.  This is the exact 
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same tone that AT&T mechanical telephone switching systems 
used at that time.  He had previously learned that by 
producing that tone into a phone receiver, he could fool 
the mechanical computers controlling the lines into 
believing the request for service was valid, thus allowing 
him to receive free, albeit stolen, long distance service. 
This led to creation of "blue boxes" which reproduced the 
2600 Hertz tone allowing the user to steal long distance 
service from AT&T.  To defeat these devices, phone 
companies improved their computer systems.  But, the 
improvement of telephone computer systems has led to new 
phreaking techniques and tools, such as green boxes, agua 
boxes, and mauve boxes.  Although a phreaker does not 
directly access the telephone companies' computers, their 
actions fall under the categories of telecommunications and 
computer crimes.
One of the first publicized cases of computer crime 
also did not directly involve computers.  In 1978, Stanley 
Mark Rifkin defrauded Security Pacific National Bank of 
US$10,200,000 by using a common technique known as social 
engineering.  The funds were computer transferred to a 
Swiss bank account, thus creating one of the earliest cases 
of computer fraud.  His caper eventually made it into the 
pages of the Guinness Book of World Records in the category 
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of "biggest computer fraud" [Mitnick & Simon, 6].  
Probably the first major event that would show the 
world the potential of direct computer crimes occurred in 
1986.  Marjie T. Britz describes what happened in her book 
Computer Forensics and Cyber Crime:  An Introduction.
...an accounting error of less than one 
dollar was investigated by a dedicated 
employee at the University of California 
at Berkeley.  This internal 
investigation revealed that a German 
hacker in the employ of the KGB had 
tapped into a military database and 
obtained sensitive (but not classified) 
information.  Using only a personal 
computer and a basic modem, this 
individual was able to connect to 
Berkeley computers via an independent 
data carrier (i.e., Tymnet).  Once 
connected, the hacker was able to move 
about the MILNET system with remarkable 
ease and relative impunity.  The fact 
that such vulnerability existed within 
data systems was especially 
disconcerting to administrators because 
of its almost accidental discovery...his 
findings resulted in the recognition of 
information risks associated with open 
systems [Britz, 34].
The entire account of this story has been written by 
the man directly involved in this game of cloak and dagger. 
Clifford Stoll's book “The Cuckoo's Egg” is a recommended 
book on the reading list for those wishing to pursue the 
International Information Systems Forensics Association's 
Certified Information Forensics Investigator (IISFA CIFI) 
certification.
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In 1988, Robert Morris, a graduate student at Cornell 
University, rocked the computing world by releasing the 
first Internet worm.  By making use of a vulnerability in 
UNIX, his worm successfully staged a buffer overflow attack 
to crash computers world-wide.  The dubbed "Morris worm" 
"crippled over 6,000 computers and caused between $5 and 
$100 million in damages" [Britz, 35].  Six thousand does 
not sound like many computers.  But in 1988, this was 
approximately ten percent of all computers on the Internet. 
When viewed in this context, one can see the impact that 
the "Morris worm" had.  For his crimes, Morris was 
convicted of violating the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 
U.S.C. § 1030.  Although he did not serve prison time, 
Morris was sentenced to probation and community service, 
and he had to pay hefty fines.
Law Enforcement Strikes Back
In the mid- to late-1980s, Law Enforcement and 
military agencies decided that computer and computer-based 
crime was beginning to exert a negative influence upon 
computing and aspects of business and finance.  These 
agencies wanted to be able to pool their resources to be 
able to combat these new crimes that were becoming more 
commonplace.  They needed to merge investigative skills 
honed over centuries with rapidly emerging and changing 
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technology.
One of the first groups formed to combat computer crime 
was the High Technology Crime Investigation Association. 
In 1984, several members of the Santa Clara County 
Industrial Security Manager's Group, including John 
O'Loughlin (now retired but security manager at Intel at 
that time and later Sun Microsystems) and Pete Kostner, 
security manager at AMD, approached Santa Clara County 
District Attorney Leo Himmelsbach to discuss the need for 
having law enforcement officers trained in the field of 
high technology crime.  Leo Himmelsbach then applied to the 
State of California and received a grant from the Office of 
Criminal Justice Planning Project approved by the Calif 
State Assembly, State Assembly Bill 1078 passed into law 
August 31, 1984, Penal Code Section 13970 called " SANTA 
CLARA COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S HIGH TECHNOLOGY CRIME 
PREVENTION PROGRAM” [Smith].  Today it has grown into an 
international organization of law enforcement agencies, 
attorneys, and management level and senior staff security 
professionals (read CIO or CISO) that “is designed to 
encourage, promote, aid and effect the voluntary 
interchange of data, information, experience, ideas and 
knowledge about methods, processes, and techniques relating 
to investigations and security in advanced technologies 
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among its membership” [HTCIA].  
It was around this time (1984) that the FBI was 
beginning to sit up and take notice of computer crimes.  To 
properly address the growing demands of investigators and 
prosecutors in a structured and programmatic manner, the 
FBI established the Computer Analysis and Response Team 
(CART) and charged it with the responsibility for computer 
analysis [FBI].
In 1990, the International Association of Computer 
Investigative Specialists was “formed to provide training 
to law enforcement personnel regarding computer forensics 
and high technology crime” [IACIS].  This organization is 
committed to promoting training and sharing of techniques 
and information between law enforcement agencies.
In 1993, the first International Conference on 
Computer Evidence was hosted by the FBI in which many law 
enforcement agencies worldwide attended.  It was such a 
success that it eventually led to the 1995 formation of the 
International Organization on Computer Evidence.  The IOCE 
was tasked with creating a uniform standard to be followed 
worldwide concerning digital evidence in 1998.  The 
reasoning behind this was to ensure that evidence would be 
gathered in a like manner internationally and that it would 
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be acceptable in courts regardless of their jurisdiction. 
The first findings were released for review in 2000 and are 
being reevaluated and updated as necessary on a regular 
basis.  
Although law enforcement agencies are banding together 
and attempting to stay ahead of the curve when dealing with 
modern computer crime, they need the help of civilian 
computer experts trained in computer forensics.  Rapidly 
changing and modern forms of computer crime is one major 
reason why.
Modern Computer Forensics - Modern Computer Crime
Modern computer crime can usually be divided into two 
categories:  computer crime and computer-based crime. 
Computer crimes are crimes committed against computer 
systems.  Computer-based crimes are crimes in which a 
computer was involved in the commission of the crime.
Computer crimes have drastically evolved from their 
reported 1986 origins.  Worms, viruses, and Trojan horses 
have become more sophisticated as the computer systems on 
which they are launched have evolved.  Melissa, I Love You, 
Code Red, Nimda, Blaster, and other malware caused ripples 
of concern in the major computing circles and widespread 
panic in the home-based PC market.  Propagation of Trojan 
horses such as SubSeven and BackOrifice have compromised 
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many systems such as those of the Apache Foundation, 
creator of the most widely-used httpd server.  With the 
rise of the popularity of the World Wide Web has come the 
hacking and defacing of web sites.  One of the more notable 
incidents was the defacing of the website of the New York 
Times by the gray-hat hacker Adrian Lamo.  Finally, theft 
of computer components can fall into this category.  Many 
times in the last decade the Los Alamos National Laboratory 
has fallen prey to theft of computer hard drives containing 
nuclear secrets.
Computer-based crime is likely more widespread than 
reported.  Most of these crimes are traditional crimes that 
have been modernized by computers.  Identity theft is a 
major part of this category.  Before modern computing, 
identity theft was difficult and time consuming.  To steal 
one's identity, the criminal had to start by stealing a 
valued possession, such as a wallet or purse.  From there, 
one could glean information such as Social Security Number, 
date of birth, address, and credit card numbers.  One could 
take this information and have a new Social Security card 
and birth certificate issued, subsequently using those 
documents to procure government-issued identity documents. 
These allowed the criminal to open lines of credit with 
retailers in the victim's name and fleece both retailer and 
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credit company.  Modern identity theft is much easier. 
Most victims willingly give their information through 
social engineering and phishing techniques.  It is now 
possible to steal the identities of many people rapidly 
with little or no effort.
Another ancient crime that has become much easier to 
perpetrate with the increase of Internet presence into 
everyday life is the propagation of scams.  One of the most 
common scams found on the Internet is the Nigerian 419 
scam, named after the section of the Nigerian criminal code 
that this type of crime falls under.  A con artist no 
longer needs to meet their victims face-to-face or try to 
create a working relationship with them to part them from 
their money.  All that is necessary is sending an email to 
the intended victim asking them to participate in a get-
rich-quick scheme, usually the transfer of large sums of 
money from Nigeria into their local bank account.  The 
intended victim gets to keep a percentage of the money, 
usually in the millions of U.S. dollars, for helping get 
the money out of Africa.  All that is necessary is sending 
your personal bank account information to the person who 
contacted you.  Unfortunately, too many people, mainly 
senior citizens, have fallen prey to this type of scam.
Yet another major neo-traditional crime that has 
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become much easier with modern computers and the Internet 
is child pornography.  No longer is it necessary for child 
pornographers to peddle their disgusting wares through 
seedy fly-by-night mail order companies or in legitimate 
adult bookstores in which knowing a special code phrase or 
secret handshake will get pedophiles the filth they want. 
The Internet has made the delivery of child pornography 
rapidly available to those who seek it.  In fact, the North 
American Man/Boy Love Association (NAMBLA) has a web site 
that encourages the legalization of child pornography and 
sex between adults and children.  What was once an 
underground movement has almost become mainstream and 
legitimized because of the Internet.
Other traditional crimes that have become modernized 
due to computers are illegal bookmaking, racketeering, 
counterfeiting, forgery, insider trading, and embezzlement 
(such as the salami slicing technique that was first 
introduced to most people in the movies Superman III and 
Office Space).  New types of crimes have sprung up directly 
related to computing.  Cybersquatting is the practice of 
buying Internet domain names belonging to companies or 
famous people and then trying to sell them to said 
organizations for an unbelievable mark-up in price or just 
not allowing ownership of them by those who should 
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legitimately have ownership rights.  This has been outlawed 
by Congressional legislation.  Cyberstalking and 
cyberharassment have moved the traditional crime of 
stalking or harassing someone into a virtual realm.  The 
cyberstalker can harass their victim almost anonymously to 
the point in which the victim no longer wants to use a 
computer.  Online pharmacies are supposedly selling 
prescription drugs to people who want them by having a 
phony doctor write them an online prescription without a 
physical consultation and having them filled and shipped to 
their home illegally.  Finally, the most common computer-
based crime, as it was recently outlawed, is the 
dissemination of spam.  Spam is unwanted email, usually in 
large volumes.  Everyone who has an email address has 
fallen victim to spammers.
Forensically Combating Modern Computer Crime
The problem with committing crimes of any nature, 
especially computer crimes, is the fact that evidence of 
the crime is always left behind.  No matter how great the 
cover-up of a computer crime, with enough determination and 
with the appropriate tools virtually all computer crimes 
can be solved.  Does this necessarily mean that a 
perpetrator will be convicted or if someone will even be 
captured?  No.  But the evidence found should point to the 
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fact that some sort of crime was committed.
How can we combat modern computer crime using computer 
forensics?  Computer forensics is an after the fact (ex 
post facto in legal terms) process.  If the process is 
performed after the fact, how can it be used to fight 
crime?  First, computer forensics can be used to secure 
digital evidence that a crime has committed and can be 
entered into court proceedings as circumstantial evidence. 
As far as I know, no one has ever been convicted on 
computer evidence alone.  However, many criminals have been 
convicted by the computer evidence in conjunction with 
volumes of other evidence.  Second, computer forensics can 
be used to validate the source of a crime being committed, 
whether it be human or machine.  Third, computer forensics 
can be used to promote awareness of the power of 
information and how it can used and misused by average 
people.  Finally, computer forensics can be used to learn 
about new forms of Internet-based attacks before they are 
common knowledge.  By implementing computer systems such as 
honeypots and analyzing them frequently, we are able to 
identify new attacks and create fixes or patches for them 
so that when they become commonplace, they will be easily 
defeated or eradicated.
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Computer Forensics vs. Computers in Forensics
Computer forensics, as stated previously, is the art 
and science of examining computer media for digital 
evidence to be useful in a court of law.  There is a 
difference between computer forensics and computers in 
forensics.  One way computers can be used in forensics is 
through software forensics.  The purpose of software 
forensics is not to look for general digital evidence for 
court proceedings.  Software forensics is mostly concerned 
with examining malware.  By analyzing a piece of malware, 
the software forensics analyst is attempting to determine 
certain aspects concerning the software.  Discovering 
information such as how the code was written, how it 
behaves, how it propagates, and ideally identifying the 
person(s) who created it are the major goals of software 
forensics.  Although computers must be used in this area of 
forensics, it is not computer forensics.
Next, an example of computers in forensics is the 
Echelon system.  The Echelon system is the computer system 
used by the United States and allies to listen to wireless 
(and some say wired) phone conversations and computer 
traffic around the world.  It roughly works this way:  the 
National Security Agency (NSA) created an algorithm known 
as Semantic Forests.  It was then licensed to Raytheon 
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Company.  Raytheon uses this algorithm as a basis for its 
commercial product, SilentRunner.  Raytheon then leased 
SilentRunner back to the NSA.  SilentRunner is then 
implemented on Echelon's computer systems.  All phone 
conversations intercepted by Echelon are recorded and 
computer transcribed into text documents.  SilentRunner has 
been programmed to "understand" the meaning of the message 
as opposed to just keyword searching a document.  "...they 
(the NSA) wanted the computer to be able to "think," and be 
able to interpret the contextual meaning of a document, 
just as a human brain would interpret the nuances of a 
written communication" [Anastasi, 217].  Therefore, the 
computer forensically analyzes the conversation and 
determines its meaning.  Many terrorist coded messages have 
been intercepted and cracked using this method.  Although 
this is a good example of computers in forensics, it is not 
computer forensics.
Finally, computers can be used in forensic 
examinations conducted by investigative laboratories. 
Popularized by television programs such as CSI, viewers can 
see how computers are beneficial to forensic 
investigations.  One recent episode showed how a computer 
could create a mirror image of a photograph and combine 
that image with the original to form a new image.  Although 
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LEGAL ISSUES IN COMPUTER FORENSICS
Disclaimer:  I am not an attorney and am not offering legal advice on any matters in this section of the 
thesis.  Do not accept my opinions as legitimate legal opinions.  By reading this section you agree not to  
hold the author nor the University of Louisville responsible for any actions taken by the reader in  
accordance with the information listed in Chapter III.
U.S. Constitution Fourth Amendment Rights
Many people are worried today that their individual 
rights and right-to-privacy are being eroded by the state. 
Although this is the opinion of some, there are still many 
protections available to citizens.  The first line of 
protection from government intrusion is the Fourth 
Amendment to the Constitution: The right of the people to 
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable 
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized [Archives].  Obviously the Founding 
Fathers of our nation had no concept of computers when they 
wrote the Bill of Rights in the late 18th century.  Yet, 
these general protections do apply to our computers and 
information in the 21st century.  In a rough summary, a 
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warrant is necessary to be sworn out to seize and search a 
computer by an agent acting on the behalf of the government 
with some exceptions:
● Consent:  If the owner of the computer agrees to allow 
the seizing and/or searching of the machine, then no 
warrant is necessary.
● Third-Party Consent:  If the computer is routinely 
used by a group of individuals, then any of the 
regular users may give consent.  If the computer is 
also used by a spouse or domestic partner, that person 
may give consent.  If the computer is owned by a 
minor, the minor's parents may give consent.  If the 
computer belongs to a private network (e.g. in the 
workplace), a system administrator may give consent.
● Implied Consent:  If the owner of a computer has 
voluntarily given up parts of their 4th Amendment 
rights (such as in terms of employment) then the 
consent to search and seizure may be implied.
● Exigent Circumstances:  Exigent circumstances apply 
when it is necessary to search and seize if an agent 
of the government believes that it must be done to 
prevent the imminent destruction of data.  This is 
usually difficult to prove ex post facto; therefore it 
is advantageous to get a warrant in this situation.
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● Plain View:  If a crime is committed with a computer 
in plain view of an agent of the government, a warrant 
is not necessary to seize the computer on which the 
crime was committed nor one needed for the subsequent 
searching of data.  The plain view doctrine does not 
authorize agents to open and view the contents of a 
computer file that they are not otherwise authorized 
to open and review [S&S]. 
● Search Incident to a Lawful Arrest:  If you are in 
possession of an electronic device (such as a pager or 
PDA) at the time of your arrest, a government agent 
may be able to seize the device and search it without 
a warrant.
● Border Searches:  If someone is attempting to import 
an electronic device such as a computer into the U.S. 
from a foreign country, the government has the right 
to search and seize these devices without warrant.
(Each bulleted topic comes directly from [S&S].  The 
summations are my own except where annotated.)
The preeminent question concerning the Fourth Amendment 
is this:  How does it directly apply to computer forensics? 
Whether we are directly an agent of the government (such as 
a law enforcement officer) or an acting agent of the 
government (such as a private contractor to a law 
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enforcement agency), we must abide by the restrictions 
placed upon us by the Fourth Amendment.  We must abide by 
the  terms of the warrant that specify exactly what we are 
allowed to seize and search pertaining to computer systems. 
If no warrant was executed, then we must make sure we are 
within the narrow bounds of the warrant-less exceptions. 
We should do this by receiving a written legal opinion from 
the appropriate government agent stating that the search 
met the warrant-less criteria and that our forensic 
analysis does not violate the Fourth Amendment rights of 
the computer's owner.
Non-Government Agent Searches
Unfortunately, your rights under the Fourth Amendment 
do not apply when search and seizure is performed by a non-
government agent.  A non-government agent is one that is 
not directly an agent of government (e.g. law enforcement) 
or acting upon the behalf of a government agency. 
Generally, searches in this section pertain to matters of 
tort law, also known as civil law or civil matters.  In 
these arenas, subpoenas are usually issued as a method of 
forcing someone to turn over a computer for searching.  The 
forensics examiner must make sure that any subpoenaed 
computers are examined as if there was a search warrant 
issued and take care to follow the proper guidelines.  
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When involving matters of the workplace, the seizure 
and searching of computers can be a tricky matter.  Usually 
consent for an investigation is given by the owner (most 
times the company) of the computers.  In accordance with 
most corporate end-user agreements, an employee waives 
their right of privacy pertaining to usage of the company's 
computer systems.  There is a thin line, though, concerning 
what information can be seized and used in civil matters. 
There is debate in the courts and the legal community about 
personal information stored on these computers and the gray 
area of violating one's privacy.  What information is 
considered personal and what is considered company 
property?  Even if a voice mail system is company property, 
the contents of the voice mails themselves may not be.  It 
depends on the jurisdiction as to how they interpret these 
quandaries.  For the forensic examiner, it is best to 
produce all possible information and allow the attorneys to 
sort out the legal issues.  Nevertheless, since the analyst 
will probably be called to testify, it is best to at least 
have some knowledge of how the local court system views 
these issues.
U.S.A. Patriot Act of 2001
As it pertains to cybercrime, the U.S.A. Patriot Act 
of 2001 has redefined many provisions in current statutory 
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law of the U.S. Code that either pertain directly or 
indirectly to our forensics investigations.  In summary:
Section 814 makes a number of changes 
to improve 18 U.S.C. § 1030, the 
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. This 
section increases penalties for hackers 
who damage protected computers (from a 
maximum of 10 years to a maximum of 20 
years); clarifies the mens rea required 
for such offenses to make explicit that 
a hacker need only intend damage, not a 
particular type of damage; adds a new 
offense for damaging computers used for 
national security or criminal justice; 
expands the coverage of the statute to 
include computers in foreign countries 
so long as there is an effect on U.S. 
interstate or foreign commerce; counts 
state convictions as "prior offenses" 
for purpose of recidivist sentencing 
enhancements; and allows losses to 
several computers from a hacker’s 
course of conduct to be aggregated for 
purposes of meeting the $5,000 
jurisdictional threshold.  [USAPA2001]
These changes indirectly affect our forensic 
investigations.  Specifically, if in the course of our 
analysis we determine that someone has illegally gained 
access to the system with the intent to damage the 
computer, a whole host of penalties may be enacted upon 
that person.  Thus, it is no longer necessary to prove that 
specific damage was done to a computer (e.g. data 
destruction or theft of intellectual property) but that the 
intruder's intent was to damage the computer.  This affects 
the scope of the investigation because now the forensic 
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examiner must now only determine that an intrusion was made 
with the idea of damaging the computer instead of actually 
proving that damage was done.  This technically releases a 
lot of investigative burden from the examiner.
As a side note, I am personally mortified by how 
broadly this concept has been written into the law and how 
even more broadly the law can be interpreted.  How is it 
possible to know a person's exact motive in relation to 
accessing a computer?  Some signs of intent can be evident 
such as unauthorized creation of user accounts and log file 
editing to remove traces of sessions.  But where does the 
interpretation of the law end?  I foresee the possibility 
of using this provision of the Patriot Act to levy 
penalties upon what we generally would refer to as 
“innocent mistakes.”  For example, someone mistakenly logs 
into a system without authorization (I have heard of it 
happening many times before with some systems using auto-
login utilities) and when realizing their mistake end the 
session.  This unauthorized entry can easily be 
misconstrued as an attempt to damage a system by 
hypersensitive network administrators and criminal charges 
can be filed against the perpetrator.  Also frightening is 
the classification of specific computers as being used for 
national security or criminal justice.  In combination with 
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the intent to damage, further penalties can be levied 
against someone making an “innocent mistake” if the 
computer has been labeled as “used for national security or 
criminal justice.”  Since there is not really a definite 
standard for labeling a computer in this manner, anyone can 
arbitrarily determine that a computer is to be labeled in 
this manner.  When you happen to access most computer 
systems, they usually do not identify their purpose to the 
user.  Therefore, a prosecuting attorney could, at a later 
time, label a computer in such a manner as to levy more 
penalties upon a defendant.  
There are some positive aspects to the Patriot Act. 
Section 816 requires the Attorney General to establish such 
regional computer forensic laboratories as he considers 
appropriate, and to provide support for existing computer 
forensic laboratories, to enable them to provide certain 
forensic and training capabilities. The provision also 
authorizes the spending of money to support those 
laboratories [USAPA2001].  This is gainful as the 
University of Louisville is a direct beneficiary of this 
provision.
Other U.S. Statutes Pertaining to Computer Crimes
There are a few other federal statutes that computer 
forensics examiners must be aware of since the information 
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that is gathered may fall directly under the jurisdiction 
of the following laws:
● 18 USC § 1030 Fraud and Related Activity in Connection 
with Computers:  This law pertains to the unauthorized 
access of computers used by the U.S. government or 
financial institutions.
● 18 USC § 2701 Unlawful Access to Stored 
Communications:   This law pertains to the 
unauthorized access of email communications that 
reside in a storage medium.  In other words, if you 
steal or access emails that are stored on a hard 
drive, CD/DVD ROM disc, floppy disk, etc., and destroy 
or alter them, you are in violation of this statute.
How these laws affect a forensics analyst is by placing the 
burden of finding proof on us.  If someone is charged under 
either one of these statutes, the examiner must produce the 
proof if any exists.
There are other statutes that pertain to computer 
crimes but would not fall directly into the scope of this 
thesis.  Pertaining to the U.S.A. Patriot Act of 2001 and 
the above sections of the U.S. Code, it should be evident 
that more technology-savvy people are needed to help craft 
future laws concerning computers.
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State and Local Regulations Concerning 
Computer Crime and Individual Rights
The Commonwealth of Kentucky has a multitude of laws 
in its Kentucky Revised Statutes that pertain to computer 
crimes:
● KRS 434.845 Unlawful Access to a Computer in the First 
Degree.
● KRS 434.850 Unlawful Access to a Computer in the 
Second Degree.
● KRS 434.851 Unlawful Access to a Computer in the Third 
Degree.
● KRS 434.853 Unlawful Access to a Computer in the 
Fourth Degree.
● KRS 434.855 Misuse of Computer Information
● KRS 510.155 Unlawful Use of Electronic Means to Induce 
a Minor to Engage in Sexual or Other Prohibited 
Activities -- Prohibition of Multiple Convictions 
Arising From Single Course of Conduct.
These statutes place the burden on the examiner to produce 
evidence, if any.  For KRS 434.845, .850, .851, and .853 
the analyst must determine if unlawful access was obtained 
and what damage was done.  It is then up to the 
Commonwealth's attorney to decide under which statute to 
pursue charges.  For KRS 434.855, .845 must first be 
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violated and the information is either stolen or received. 
KRS 510.155 pertains to chatting up a minor on the Internet 
for purposes of sexual acts being committed by or on said 
minor.  This provision also covers state government agents 
posing as minors on the Internet.  Since chat logs can be 
stored on a hard drive (and most are), the forensics 
examiner must produce any evidence relating to violation of 
this statute.
From what I can gather from the web pages of the 
Louisville Metro government 
(http://www.louisvilleky.gov/MetroCouncil/default.htm), it 
apparently defaults to KRS law concerning computer crimes 
as I could not find any ordinances pertaining to them.
What is evident is that anyone who wishes to be 
employed as a computer forensics analyst must be well-
versed in the applicable laws surrounding search and 
seizure.  Not only must one have assurance that what 
actions one performs are legal, but one must be prepared to 




Why are Forensic Analysts Necessary?
The need for forensic analysts is four-fold.  First, 
with the advent of inexpensive personal computers it has 
become easy to own one.  Personal computers are no longer 
only in the possession of the wealthy or universities. 
Many households have at least one, if not many, computers. 
Internet access is also becoming cheaper.  Gone are the 
days of Internet access being limited to those who could 
afford the per-minute charges of dial-up access.  It is now 
cheaper to have a 6 Mb/s Internet connection than basic 
cable television.  The combination of cheaper and faster 
personal computers coupled with cheaper and faster Internet 
access has created an environment in which computer-related 
crime has become rampant.  
Next, the number of companies who have become computer-
oriented has dramatically risen in the last decade.  Most 
companies today that do not have an Internet presence 
cannot compete with those who do.  Internally, companies 
have also replaced archaic manual work practices with 
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modern computer-based practices.  The popularity of 
relational database management systems (RDBMS) by vendors 
such as Oracle, IBM, and Microsoft are an example of this 
trend.  These RDBMS systems have simplified the storage and 
retrieval of massive amounts of data by almost entirely 
eliminating the need for filing cabinets full of 
irreplaceable combustible paper materials.  Drafting and 
architectural design has almost completely migrated to 
Computer Aided Drafting (CAD) tools.  Due to these 
advancements, companies have become greatly computer-based. 
Combine this with having an Internet presence and you have 
created an environment in which computer-related crime and 
theft of trade secrets can thrive.
Thirdly, with computer-related crime rising, Law 
Enforcement is having a much greater time combating this 
non-traditional criminal field.  Most local police 
departments, save for ones in major metropolitan areas, 
have neither the manpower nor the time or budget to 
investigate computer-related crimes.  Law Enforcement 
agencies are generally understaffed and underfunded for 
investigating traditional crimes and would rather allocate 
their meager resources to destroying methamphetamine labs, 
arresting burglary and murder suspects, and policing 
neighborhoods than tracking down hackers and disgruntled 
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employees.  Therefore, no training is given to recruits in 
tracking computer crimes at most police academies.  Most 
departments who maintain computer crime divisions must 
spend large sums of money to train seasoned officers to 
cope with the dynamics of changing digital crimes.
Finally, the reluctance of Law Enforcement to intercede 
in civil matters is well-known.  Information valuable to 
civil litigation can be stored on computers.  The 
activities of a cheating spouse can possibly be found on a 
personal computer.  Information pertaining to misuse of 
computer systems by an employee can be beneficial to a 
company that is the defendant of a wrongful termination 
lawsuit.  By viewing the contents of a computer, a 
defendant accused of pirating software, movies, or music 
can prove their innocence or ensure their guilt.
These four situations prove a singular point:  computer 
forensic analysts are necessary.  Criminal activity can be 
buried in computer media.  Civil lawsuits can hinge 
entirely on computer-based information.  The only sure-fire 
method of producing the necessary information for criminal 
and civil proceedings is through computer forensics.  Only 
a well-trained computer forensics analyst can procure and 
produce this data and make it stand up in a court of law.
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Why is Computer Forensics Training Necessary?
The necessity of computer forensics training is very 
evident.  As a law enforcement tool, it can be invaluable 
in tying together the activities or associations of 
suspects or groups.  It can also be used by attorneys to 
establish the fault or prove the innocence of a defendant. 
Many large companies are now keeping computer forensic 
analysts on staff to augment their Information Security 
teams.  Some corporations, such as Deloitte & Touche, LLC, 
even have large, multi-location computer forensics 
departments that can image and analyze massive volumes of 
information at many locations given little notice.  
Currently, Law Enforcement in general is unable to 
handle the case load presented by computer crime in 
addition to traditional criminal activities.  The possible 
steps for the law enforcement community to rectify this 
situation are to either train their own members to perform 
computer forensics work, thus removing much needed manpower 
from traditional sectors, or hire civilians.  Although the 
Federal Government is stepping forward to help Law 
Enforcement by creating regional forensics centers in major 
metropolitan areas, eventually this may not be enough. 
Training civilians willing to work for Law Enforcement in 
the area of computer forensics must be the solution.  In 
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fact, some of the regional forensics centers, initially 
only staffed by law enforcement officers trained in 
computer forensics, have had to hire civilians to cope with 
the overwhelming amount of casework with which they have 
been presented.
In the civil arena, attorneys will need to hire 
private, impartial firms to perform computer forensics as 
necessary.  This is usually essential in cases of wrongful 
termination due to computer misuse.  Even if the defendant 
company has its own internal computer forensic analysis 
team, a good plaintiff's attorney would be able to raise 
reasonable doubt concerning the information captured and 
analyzed by a non-neutral party.  Therefore, an ably 
trained computer forensic analyst who is impartial is 
crucial.  
It is my goal to ensure that computer forensics 
training is available to not only Law Enforcement but to 
any competent and educated civilian willing to pursue the 
field as their career.  They must be as passionate about 
computer forensics as I am and not just consider it a hobby 
or means to make money.  They must be willing to further 
explore the art and science of it and commit to further 
research so that the discipline does not become stagnant.  
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Definition of Thesis Scope
Although the field of computer forensics is wide-
ranging, covering topics such as live network capture, raid 
array analysis, etc., the scope of this thesis is rather 
narrow.  This thesis will focus exclusively on hard drive 
analysis from machines that are not running when 
information capture takes place.  This is the most common 
form of computer forensics analysis today.  Incorporating a 
wider field of the types of analysis would only serve to 
distract from the main focus.
We can further refine our scope by identifying the 
specific major tasks of our methodology and praxis.  In the 
acquisition phase, we will concentrate on sanitizing media, 
acquiring data, and chain of custody.  In the analysis 
phase, we will concentrate on finding obvious information, 
keyword searching, auditing log files, malware detection, 
file header rectification, NTFS alternate data streams, 
image processing, and data carving.  Finally, in the post-
analysis phase, we will concentrate on documentation 
lifecycle and report writing.
By rather narrowly defining our scope, we should be 
able to incorporate most necessary tasks used in a 
forensics analysis and guard against scope creep by staying 




Search and Seizure of Information
 A search was legally defined by the courts in State 
vs Woodall as “an examination of a man’s house or other 
buildings or premises, or of his person, or of his vehicle, 
aircraft, etc., with a view to the discovery of contraband 
or illicit or stolen property, or some evidence of guilt to 
be used in the prosecution of a criminal action for some 
crime or offense with which he is charged” (according to 
Black’s Law Dictionary).  A seizure was defined in Molina 
vs State as “the act of taking possession of property, 
e.g., for a violation of law or by virtue of an execution” 
[of a warrant] [Shinder & Tittel, 588].  These terms define 
are generally accepted when pertaining to physical items. 
But how can these terms apply to the concept of information 
which is an intangible quantity?  In other words, how can 
we search for and seize something that doesn't physically 
exist?  In Chapter III of this thesis, I detailed my 
interpretation of the rights of search and seizure as 
provided by various laws such as the Fourth Amendment to 
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the Constitution, the U.S.A. Patriot Act of 2001, and 
various Kentucky Revised Statutes.  In this section, we 
will explore the ideas and recommendations concerning 
search and seizure techniques as they relate to computer 
forensics from readily available technical books.
In his book, John Vacca breaks down the searching and 





In the preparation phase, Vacca emphasizes preparation 
before proceeding to the search and seizure location.  Tips 
are to make sure all media have been sanitized and 
documented as such (Vacca, 136).  He also recommends that 
if you are not the person to perform the analysis, you need 
to make sure you the person you have chosen to perform the 
examination.  The person needs to be highly skilled and be 
able to competently testify in court concerning the methods 
used to perform the analysis and what information was found 
in the search (Vacca, 136-7).
In the snapshot phase, Vacca recommends literally 
taking snapshots of the scene of the seizure.  He wants 
photos of the entire physical area surrounding the machine 
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to be seized.  After that, photographs of the actual 
computer the seizing is performed on is to be photographed 
in detail.  Make sure to document every component and type 
of connection whether internal or external.  Vacca then 
goes on to explain labeling everything in accordance with 
your predetermined methodology.  The evidence custodian at 
the scene (if you have one) is to then go through and 
validate everything that has been done in the investigation 
thus far.  What sets Vacca apart from other works I have 
read is his insistence on videotaping the entrance upon the 
scene of all personnel involved, all actions of the 
searching and seizing, the exiting the scene, and the 
transportation and storage of the seized materials.  He 
recommends this so no defense attorney can claim that 
evidence was planted by the person or team performing the 
search and seizure (Vacca, 137-8).
In the transport phase, Vacca first assumes that the 
forensic investigators have the authority to transport the 
seized items to an off-site location.  After making 
recommendations for packing and transporting, he once again 
is adamant about videotaping (or photographing in this 
step) the evidence leaving the scene and its journey to the 
transport vehicle.  He also strongly recommends 
videotaping/photographing and documenting the moving of the 
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evidence from the transport vehicle into the storage or 
examination facility (Vacca, 138).
In the final phase, examination, Vacca explains 
documenting the preparation of the seized information. 
Unpacking and visually inspecting the evidence is first. 
He then recommends making duplicates of the hard drive if 
this was not done on-scene.  When finished, it is now time 
to inspect the BIOS of the seized machine and check for 
time discrepancies.  Both of these previous steps must be 
documented.  When finished duplicating the original drive, 
you are then to seal it in an anti-static bag and store it 
in a proper storage facility (Vacca, 138-9).
Chain of Custody
Chain of custody is primarily a list of persons and 
their respective time and places in which they have come 
into contact with or possession of a piece of evidence. 
Douglas Schweitzer states that “the chain-of-custody 
process is used to maintain and document the chronological 
history of the evidence” [Schweitzer, 149].  He recommends 
having two forensic investigators assigned to each case so 
that each can observe and document the steps of the other. 
He highly recommends over-documenting because of the 
importance of chain of custody to computer forensics.  He 
maintains that one of the most well-known tactics used in a 
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courtroom is the claim of mishandling evidence (see the 
notorious O.J. Simpson trial).  By documenting everything 
possible, you minimize this possibility (Schweitzer, 149). 
Schweitzer includes a checklist of items to note as you are 
working on the case:
● The current date and time (include appropriate time 
zone) 
● Broken hardware or any significant problems
● Note on the evidence found, which will go into your 
final report in more detail.  These would essentially 
be notes that anyone could pick up and, at a glance, 
know exactly where you left off in your assessment of 
the seized computer and media.
● Special techniques (for example, sniffers, password 
crackers, and so on.) used above and beyond normal 
processes.
● Outside sources used (for example, third-party 
companies or products that helped to provide 
assistance and information)  
● The names of all personnel involved in the 
investigation including a list of administrators 
responsible for the routine maintenance of systems
● A record of all applications running on the suspect's 
computer
● A list of who had access to the collected evidence 
including date and time of access, as well as date and 
time of any actions taken by those with access.  In 
addition, the clock of the affected system must be 
compared with the actual current time and any 
discrepancies must be noted with the system clock left 
unchanged.  Adjustment of the clock may subsequently 
be considered data tampering, leaving the resultant 
evidence inadmissible.
● Details of the initial assessment leading to the 
formal investigation
● Circumstances surrounding the suspected incident 
including who initially reported the suspected 
incident along with date and time
● A complete list of all computer systems included in 
the investigation along with system specifications
● A printed copy of any organizational policies and 
logon banners that relate to accessing and using 
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computer systems
● A comprehensive list of steps used to collect and 
analyze evidence (All points [Schweitzer, 149-50])
While making these notes, Schweitzer recommends you do 
so in a notebook in which pages cannot be removed.  This 
should prevent a legal defense team from claiming that 
information beneficial to their client was removed from the 
notebook. 
I chose to profile the Schweitzer book in this section 
because it presents the most comprehensive information 
relating to chain of custody and its importance to a 
forensics investigation.  I believe this is so because his 
book focuses more on incident response, which is the first 
phase of an investigation, than the actual computer 
forensics analysis process.  Mandia, Prosise, & Pepe's 
Incident Response & Computer Forensics placed more emphasis 
upon the physical handling of evidence as opposed to the 
chain of custody documentation (Mandia et al., Chapter 9). 
Nelson et al.'s Computer Forensics and Investigations 
barely even mentions chain of custody (Nelson et al., 28) 
but does provide a sample chain of custody form for a 
corporate investigation.  The list what the differing 
fields of the form are, but no explanation of what should 
be recorded or in what manner (Nelson et al., 34-6).
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Data Acquisition
There is a bit of debate in the computer forensics 
community about whether to create a bit-stream duplicate of 
a suspect hard drive or just to make an image of it. 
Creating a bit-stream duplicate involves transferring all 
information bit-by-bit from one hard drive to another 
without changing the information on the source drive.  In 
other words, a bit-stream duplicate is an exact clone of 
its parent.  An image is similar to a bit-stream duplicate 
in that it copies all bits from the source drive but 
differs in how it stores this information.  The imaging 
process creates a file (or multiple files) containing this 
information as opposed cloning a hard drive.  These files 
can be compressed for easier storage and transportation or 
can remain uncompressed.  The advantage of imaging is that 
the information can be stored on CD or DVD media and 
transported easier than a duplicated hard drive.  The 
advantage of a bit-stream duplicate is the ability to 
actually use (or reuse) the hard drive as it was in the 
suspect machine.  Whichever route is taken, the information 
must be verified using MD5 or SHA checksums on both the 
source and target drives.
Most of my sources I explored for this section 
recommend creation of a bit-stream duplicate ((Carrier, 47-
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9), (Kruse & Heiser, 15), (Mandia et al., Chapter 7), 
(Nelson, et al., 47-9), (NTI, Section 4), (Schweitzer, 49-
51), (Vacca, 35-37)) as their preferred method of copying 
the information from a suspect hard drive.  The lone 
holdout is Shinder & Tittel's Scene of the Cybercrime: 
Computer Forensics Handbook.  This book never actually 
mentions bit-stream duplication and concentrates solely on 
imaging (Shinder & Tittel, 560).  Schweitzer refers to bit-
stream duplication as “imaging” (Schweitzer, 49) and 
Nelson, et al. gives definitions and explanations of the 
differences between both (Nelson, et al., 47).  
As for recommendations of what tools to use to perform 
a bit-stream duplication, dd is the most common tool 
mentioned for a software-based copy , although NTI's 
SafeBack software ((Mandia et al., 164-8), (Nelson et al., 
293), (NTI, Section 4), (Vacca, 35-37)) is the one 
mentioned most after dd.  For hardware-based copies, the 
ICS ImageMASSter Solo is the hardware device recommended 
most ((Kruse & Heiser, 14-5), (Mandia et al., 154), 
(Nelson, et al., 205-6)).
All sources highly emphasize the need to verify that 
the information on the source and target drives are exact 
via MD5 or SHA sums.  The need to ensure that the data on 
the suspect drive was not disturbed prior to duplication is 
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also impressed upon the reader.
Examination Guidelines
Even though the sources used for this thesis are in 
relative agreement in the previous section concerning 
forensic duplication, they will diverge greatly come the 
examination guidelines section.  Each source has and should 
have their own opinions concerning the steps of 
examination.  What I did not expect was the great diversity 
of these opinions.  All are valid.  However, I can believe 
it may lead to confusion amongst those who choose to learn 
forensic examination procedures from only one source. 
Therefore, this section will detail a cross-examination of 
the recommendations provided by the various authors.  
Beginning with Marcella et al.'s Cyber Forensics – A 
Field Manual for Collecting, Examining, and Preserving 
Evidence of Computer Crimes, the editors decide to break 
down the examination guidelines into two sections, non-
liturgical (Marcella et al., Chapter 2) and liturgical 
(Marcella et al., Chapter 3) forensic examinations.  A non-
liturgical examination is one that is not expected to 
involve a trial or legal action of some sort.  A liturgical 
examination is one in which a trial or legal action is 
expected.  I do not think this is wise as it impresses upon 
the reader that one can approach an investigation from 
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either point of view and this can affect the outcome of the 
information found.  I can understand why they would perform 
differing investigations, but I still feel leery about it. 
How I differ in my approach is to treat all investigations 
as liturgical because you never know if your examination 
will become a component of a trial.  Your investigation may 
cause someone to be fired and in turn they sue their former 
employer for wrongful termination.  The examination you 
performed must be thorough enough to withstand the scrutiny 
of a well-prepared defense attorney.  Therefore, unless I 
had in writing the requirement to perform a non-liturgical 
analysis with the stipulation that I would be held without 
fault if the case were to ever proceed to trial, I would 
perform a liturgical analysis.  This would be done to 
protect me from being incorrectly sued by a client who 
believes that my non-liturgical examination harmed them.
The non-liturgical examination process recommended by 
Marcella et al. is rather non-invasive.  Its first step is 
to isolate the equipment (Marcella et al., 27-8).  Making 
sure you are investigating and duplicating the correct 
machine is of utmost priority in this step.  Once seized, 
an examination of cookies (Marcella et al., 29-31), 
bookmarks (Marcella et al., 31-2), history buffer (Marcella 
et al., 32-4), cache (Marcella et al., 34), temporary 
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Internet files (Marcella et al., 35), tracking of logon 
duration and times (Marcella et al., 35-6), recent document 
list (Marcella et al., 36), tracking of illicit software 
installation and use (Marcella et al., 37-8), reviewing the 
system (Marcella et al., 38-41), a manual review (Marcella 
et al., 41-2), and hidden files (Marcella et al., 42-3) is 
performed.  As this is a highly non-invasive procedure, I 
believe the only conclusions that can be drawn from this 
type of investigation is whether or not an employee 
violated the company's AUP (acceptable use policy for the 
computer systems).  Not much more information can be 
gathered using the steps prescribed by Marcella et al.  
There can be many comparisons drawn between the 
different sources pertaining to a liturgical examination. 
By default, the other sources imply performing a liturgical 
examination by the more invasive methodologies they 
recommend ((Kruse & Heiser, 16-9), (Mandia et al., Chapter 
11), (Nelson, et al., Chapter 10)).  Kruse & Heiser 
recommend beginning with a cursory examination of the 
master boot record and boot sector of a drive using either 
a hex editor or a forensic examination program (Kruse & 
Heiser, 16).  Next, they recommend using whatever search 
tools you have available, whether your hex editor or 
forensic program, to perform a keyword search on the system 
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(Kruse & Heiser, 16).  Mandia et al. and Nelson et al. 
unfortunately spend most of their time not explaining 
techniques as much as seemingly pitching forensic 
examination software products and giving an overview of the 
techniques using these products ((Mandia et al., 244-59), 
(Nelson et al., 322-35)).  Two of the sources then agreed 
upon the next step:  retrieving deleted files ((Kruse & 
Heiser, 17), (Mandia et al., 260-75)).  Finally, Kruse & 
Heiser and Mandia et al. recommend examining slack space 
and unallocated clusters for fragments or entire pieces of 
files ((Kruse & Heiser, 17), (Mandia et al., 275-8)).
Interesting to note is the importance that Nelson et 
al. places on finding hidden data.  Even though the book 
virtually ignored the general concept of retrieving deleted 
files, it does produce a fine section concerning common 
data hiding techniques (Nelson et al., 335-44).  The 
techniques explored are hiding partitions (Nelson et al., 
335-7), marking bad clusters (Nelson et al., 337-8), bit-
shifting (Nelson et al., 338-42), steganography (Nelson et 
al., 342-3), file encryption (Nelson et al., 343), and 
recovering passwords (Nelson et al., 344).
As for Marcella et al., I was disappointed by their 
chapter concerning liturgical examinations (Marcella et 
al., Chapter 3).  This chapter was a rehash of the previous 
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non-liturgical examination guidelines, focusing exclusively 
on Microsoft Windows operating systems, with some 
additions.  The additions were few and not really invasive 
techniques.  The addition of searching the hard drive 
temporary files (Marcella et al., 55), such as swap space, 
and the registry (Marcella et al., 57-64) did not truly 
offset the need for more invasive procedures that a 
liturgical examination should include.
As for Vacca's book, he really did not cover the 
techniques used to perform a forensics investigation.  His 
book focused more on the steps up to and including the data 
seizure, constructing a timeline based upon the seized 
information, and information warfare.  It seems his book 
prefers to focus on the acts committed as they are being 
committed as opposed to finding the evidence of the acts ex 
post facto.
Are these sources poor in nature?  By no means.  Most 
of these sources choose to be more specific in their 
chapters that deal with each popular operating system 
individually.  Unlike Marcella et al.'s exclusive focus on 
performing forensic examinations on Microsoft Windows-based 
machines, the other three major sources have chapters or 
sections of chapters pertaining to UNIX/Linux forensics 
((Kruse & Heiser, Chapter 11), (Mandia et al., Chapter 13), 
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(Nelson et al., sections of Chapters 4 & 10)).  They also 
have chapters or sections of chapters dealing with Windows 
forensics ((Kruse & Heiser, Chapter 8), (Mandia et al., 
Chapter 12), (Nelson et al., Chapter 3 and parts of Chapter 
10)).  Since these specifics are beyond the scope of this 
thesis, they will not be investigated.  
Basic Report Structure
The best source I have read concerning the topic of 
report writing is the National Institute of Justice's 
Forensic Examination of Digital Evidence:  A Guide for Law 
Enforcement.  Although the other sources gave their 
opinions upon what should be included in a report ((Mandia 
et al., Chapter 17), (Nelson, et al., Chapter 13)), I 
believe it is best to trust the ones who run the courts, 
the United States Government.  The reason why I am focusing 
primarily on this source is that the likelihood that your 
investigative case winds up in court is fairly high.  If 
the government publishes a resource in which it outlines 
what needs to be in a report, then we can safely assume 
this is what is minimally expected to be entered as 
evidence in a courtroom.  Does this mean that only these 
items are to appear in the report?  No, but it does give us 
a skeleton on which to craft our report around and add 
additional items as necessary (specifically if the 
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prosecutor wanted certain findings highlighted).
The following list contains what, at a minimum, must be 
in the examiner's report:
● Identity of the reporting agency.
● Case identifier or submission number.
● Case investigator.
● Identity of the submitter.
● Date of receipt.
● Date of report.
● Descriptive list of items submitted for examination, 
including serial number, make, and model.
● Identity and signature of the examiner.
● Brief description of steps taken during examination, 
such as string searches, graphics image searches, and 
recovering erased files.
● Results/conclusions. (All points [NIJ, 20])
The NIJ also states that it would be beneficial to include 
the following even though it is not mandatory:
● Summary of findings
● Details of findings
This section should describe in greater detail the 
results of the examinations and may include:
■ Specific files related to the request.
■ Other files, including deleted files, that 
support the findings.
■ String searches, keyword searches, and text 
string searches.
■ Internet-related evidence, such as Web site 
traffic analysis, chat logs, cache files, e-mail, 
and news group activity.
■ Graphic image analysis.
■ Indicators of ownership, which could include 
program registration data.
■ Data analysis.
■ Description of relevant programs on the examined 
items.
■ Techniques used to hide or mask data, such as 
encryption, steganography, hidden attributes, 
hidden partitions, and file name anomalies.
● Supporting materials
● Glossary  (All points [NIJ, 20-1])
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In Appendix A of the NIJ source, the government has 
compiled a list of sample cases with their sample 
concluding reports that is an excellent source of 
information for those concerned about how to format their 
reports (NIJ, 23-38).
In general, even though the sources used may differ in 
their approaches, one can create a basic methodology from 





The methodology I am proposing here is one that is 
easily teachable in a classroom and laboratory setting.  By 
no means is it complete as it remains in the scope of this 
thesis.  This methodology may be comparable to what one 
would receive if they attended a basic computer forensics 
course provided by a proprietary company.  This methodology 
is my informed opinion on what should be taught to students 
in a graduate-level computer forensics course.  It has been 
influenced by outside sources listed in the references. 
The laboratory curricula of Appendix A of this thesis is to 
be applied in the laboratory section of a computer 
forensics course following this methodology.  Although it 
does not cover all sections of the methodology, it does 
complement its major topics.
Introduction to Standard PC Hardware
Students need to know the geometry of hard drives so 
they will understand how an operating system physically 
stores information on disk.  This is done so they will know 
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how easy it is to hide information that is not evident to 
the naked eye.  Topics that should be addressed are:





● Physical Sector Structure
● Heads
● Calculating hard drive capacity from CHS method
● Multiple Zone Recording
● Accessing the Drives
■ Interrupt 13 Access
■ 16-Bit ATA Addressing Access
■ Bit Shift Translation
■ Logical Block Addressing (LBA)
■ Extended Interrupt 13 Access
■ 48-Bit ATA/ATAPI Addressing Access
● Host Protected Areas
Differing Media Standards
Students must be able to understand and differentiate 
among the three major hard drive interfaces, their 
respective generations, and various implementations of the 
technologies.  This allows the student to be prepared when 
he or she encounters a computer with a less than usual hard 
drive interface or implementation scheme.  Topics that 
should be addressed are:
● IDE/ATA Interface (PATA)
■ Historical IDE Standards
■ Current ATA/ATAPI-6 Standard
■ Transfer Speeds (MB/s)
■ 40-pin, 80-pin, and Notebook Connectors
● Serial-ATA Interface (SATA)
■ SATA/150 Standard (aka SATA/1.5Gb Standard)
■ SATA/3Gb Standard (aka SATA/300 Standard)
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■ Transfer Speeds (MB/s)
■ Connectors (Data and Power), Notebook Connectors
■ eSATA
● SCSI Interface
■ Historical SCSI Standards
■ Current Ultra320 Standard
■ New Serial Attached SCSI Standard
■ Transfer Speeds (MB/s)
■ Various 50-pin Connectors, Current 68-pin and 80-
pin Connectors
■ SCSI Termination and Device IDs
● RAID
■ What is RAID?







■ Software RAID Array vs. Hardware Implementation
System Documentation
Students need to learn the utmost importance of 
documentation of all processes used and all evidence found. 
It cannot be stressed enough by the instructor that a court 
case may collapse solely upon the fact that the 
documentation was shoddy, incomplete, or worse yet, 
nonexistent.  The students must learn that even if the 
steps they take seem inconsequential, they need to 
document.  Topics that need to be addressed are:
● Creating and continuing chain of custody forms
● Documenting procedures






■ Image viewing and processing
■ Etc.
● Maintaining and storing documentation
● Making sure documentation is easily readable
Data Capture and Verification
The first crucial step in computer forensics is the 
accurate capture and verification of all information from a 
suspect hard drive.  If this step is performed incorrectly, 
it is virtually a waste of time to perform a forensic 
analysis as the information captured is most likely 
“dirty”, meaning the information probably changed moving 
from the source drive to the target drive.  In this 
section, an emphasis must be placed upon using all 
precautions when capturing data and verifying that the 
information has not been altered.  Topics that need to be 
addressed are:
● Target Media
■ New Hard Drives
■ Reusing Hard Drives
● Forensic Sanitizing
● DOD Standard for Forensic Sanitizing
■ New vs. Used Debate
● Capture Situation:  Seizure of Entire Computer System 
vs. Hard Drive Seizure
● Capture Situation:  Live Capture vs. Lab Capture
● The Great Debate:  To Pull the Plug or Not?  Shutting 
Down Running Systems.
● To Dump or Not to Dump? (Memory of a Running System)
● Documenting a System with Photographs
■ Photographing the Screen of a Live System
■ Photographing (from all angles) an Entire 
Computer System Being Seized
● Common Methods of Capture
■ Portable Duplication Devices
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■ Duplicating or Imaging Using Lab-Based Equipment
■ Crossover Cable Capture
● Forensic Bit-Stream Duplication
■ What Bit-Stream Duplication Is
■ Advantages Over Imaging
■ Logistics of Bit-Stream Duplication
● Cost
● Storage of Duplicates
■ Advantages of Having More Than One Duplicate
■ Devices for Duplication
■ Hashing the Source Hard Drive
● MD5 Sums
● SHA Sums
● Limitations and Attacks of MD5 Sums
● Limitations and Attacks of SHA Sums
■ Verification of Original (MD5 and/or SHA)
■ Verification of Duplicate (MD5 and/or SHA)
● Forensic Imaging
■ What Forensic Imaging Is
■ Advantages Over Bit-Stream Duplication
■ Logistics of Forensic Imaging
● Cost
● Storage of Images
■ Hardware Write-Blockers
● Why They are Necessary
● Functions
● Various Types, Interfaces, and Manufacturers
■ Imaging Software
■ Verification of Original (MD5 and/or SHA)
■ Verification of Duplicate (MD5 and/or SHA)
● Storage and Transportation of Suspect Hard Drives and 
Duplicates/Images
■ Equipment Necessary for Short-Term Storage and 
Transportation
● Lockable Container(s) (Preferably Padded)
● Anti-static Bubble Wrap and Bags
■ Equipment Necessary for Storage During Cases
● Heavy-Duty Personal Fire-Proof Safes
● Bank Vault Safe Deposit Boxes
● Company Vault
■ Equipment Necessary for Long-Term Storage
● Likelihood of Needing Long-Term Storage





Of next most vital importance is chain of custody. 
Chain of custody is the process of documenting when the 
suspect and duplicate/image hard drives are in someone's 
possession, who that person is, where and when it is being 
stored when not in someone's possession, and what actions 
are being performed on those drives.  Concepts that need to 
be presented to the students are:
● Chain of Custody Forms
■ What Should Be Included on a Chain of Custody 
Form
■ Sample Chain of Custody Forms
■ How to Fill Out a Chain of Custody Form
■ How to Create a Custom Chain of Custody Form
■ Short- and Long-Term Storage of Forms
System Investigation, Non-Forensic Environment
PREFACE
The reasoning behind why there is even a discussion of 
performing part of a system investigation in a non-forensic 
environment is the additional benefits that come about 
using these techniques.  I am a firm believer in making 
multiple bit-stream duplicates or a single bit-stream 
duplicate and multiple forensic images.  The multiple 
copies will allow for a forensic and a non-forensic 
viewing.  
I am of the opinion that much is lost in a forensics 
investigation if you cannot view the system “in context.” 
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In other words, if you cannot get the look-and-feel of a 
system and be able to search for obvious pieces of 
evidence, you may not be getting the entire story being 
presented by the suspect system.  This is why I prefer to 
be able to seize an entire computer system so I can use one 
of the bit-stream duplicates (definitely not the original 
hard drive) to manually search a system.  Even without the 
original computer system, the duplicate should work in 
another computer system, usually with a tweaking of the 
drivers.  This “in-context” look can help fill in the gaps 
of the overall picture.  I can easily see what software is 
installed on the system, what programs run upon system 
startup, if malware is on the system, if hacktools or other 
nefarious items exist, and other things that are more 
complicated in a forensic environment.  Therefore, I 
believe a full forensics analysis should not be done 
without a non-forensic environment component.
Malware Detection Phase I
The first action that should be taken when starting 
the system is to search for initial signs of malware. 
There are many types of malware, but we are specifically 
searching for booby-traps.  These are programs that are 
created to destroy the contents of a hard drive if the 
operating system is booted in a way that is unexpected. 
64
For example, if the system boots without the user pressing 
a specific key combination, the software may be activated 
to destroy the contents of the drive.  To circumvent this, 
we should boot the system from a protected floppy disk and 
physically search the hard drive for known booby-traps.  If 
we are satisfied that none are present, then we should 
reboot the system without the floppy in place.  If we 
detect one, we should determine what is the sequence of 
events to perform to allow for normal system booting or we 
can attempt to destroy the booby-trap by physically 
removing it from the system.
Understanding the Target Environment
Once we boot the system, we need to understand the 
target environment.  The students should be taught the 
following concepts in relation to this:
● Determining if a login ID and password is necessary
■ Using tools to crack or change system passwords
● Determining the Operating System
■ Forcing Microsoft systems to identify themselves
■ Forcing UNIX/Linux systems to identify themselves
● Looking for customized PATH variables
● Viewing user lists and group lists
● Determining what processes are running
● Listing open ports and services with the system idle 
(this can be a great help in determining if any 
malware or rogue processes exist)
Looking for Obvious Information
This is the section in which we search for obvious 
pieces of evidence.  In a forensic environment, it can be 
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easy to overlook things because you are seeing them in an 
abstract manner and not in context.  Therefore, we will 
begin searching for many things that may not appear obvious 
in a forensic environment but should stand out in a non-
forensic environment.  Things such as:
● Start with the Desktop
■ Look at what files are on the Desktop.
■ Is there a custom background?
■ Is there a custom screen saver?
■ Is there a custom theme?
■ Is there a custom mouse pointer?
■ Do the shortcuts go to their intended programs or 
files?
■ Are there mislabeled things on the Desktop?
■ In Windows, what are the recently viewed 
documents and what are listed as favorites?
■ What are the programs that can be run from the 
task bar/start menu?
● Search the Documents area
■ Is there anything that obviously appears to be 
evidence?
■ Is there anything that looks abnormal or out of 
place?
● Search for Email
■ Tracing email headers to determine true source
● Search for installed software
■ Determine what programs are on the system
■ Look for software packages buried in non-default 
locations.  This could mean that someone is 
trying to hide something.
■ Determine if anti-virus and/or anti-spyware 
software is installed and if the definitions are 
up-to-date.
The following sections do not necessarily need to be 
performed in the order listed.
Log File Audit and Interpretation
● Read the security log to determine who logged onto the 
system and when.
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● Read the event viewer log (for Windows) to determine 
what programs have run (if enabled).
● Read the history of commands run (for UNIX/Linux) to 
determine what commands were issued.
● If the system has a software firewall, determine its 
settings and read the log for connections to and from 
other machines.
● Traverse any other logs the system may be keeping.
Malware Detection Phase II
In this section, we need to be on the lookout for any 
forms of malware in the system.  Viruses, worms, Trojan 
horses, spyware, adware, keyloggers, and nefarious cookies 
can cause major problems to a computer.  I have been told 
stories third-hand about how someone accused of being in 
possession of child pornography was exonerated when a 
forensics analyst determined that a Trojan horse or spyware 
was surreptitiously downloading images to their system.  I 
would even categorize programs that allow a user to destroy 
data as malware.  We should sweep the system for malware 
but not destroy it.  This sweeping should give us a listing 
of what is plaguing the system.  We then should be able to 
correlate with the logs the communications the machine 
performed via the malware.  If the system contains anti-
virus or anti-spyware tools, we may also want to sweep the 
system as a whole through a write-blocker (after booting 
through a safe floppy disk or through another machine). 
This may determine for us whether these tools had been 
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disabled by the malware (this is very possible).  I would 
also recommend sweeping with multiple tools as not all 
tools will find all things.
Improper User/Privilege Detection
This is also a fairly easy technique to perform and 
you will find this primarily in servers but it is known to 
appear in PCs that have been hacked.  Most people who 
create new user accounts on a system as a way to return to 
a compromised computer for further exploration/damage, 
storage of files, or to use as a base for launching attacks 
on other systems.  Most lesser-skilled hackers are not 
going to create account names that match the naming scheme 
used by legitimate accounts.  This makes it rather easy to 
spot the phony account.  For the accounts that seem to meet 
the naming criteria but seem out of place (doesn't seem to 
be in the correct user group, etc.), rectification with the 
logs of when and from where the account was created is 
necessary.  Non-default group names may also be a sign of 
an intrusion.  If students are aware of the default user 
groups in Windows and UNIX/Linux, it should make these 
aberrations stand out.
System Investigation, Forensic Environment
PREFACE
In this section, there are some assumptions that need 
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to be made.  We are going to assume that the students have 
available to them multiple forensics analysis tools 
including at least one major analysis program (such as 
EnCase, FTK, etc.) and multiple minor programs (data 
carving tools, password crackers, file viewers, forensic 
boot floppy, etc.).  We will also assume that the students 
will be shown how to properly set up their equipment and 
how to properly use these tools.
Please note that these steps do not necessarily need 
to be performed in any particular order.
Alternate Data Stream Detection (NTFS Only)
One of the easiest tasks that can be performed in a 
forensics environment is detecting NTFS Alternate Data 
Streams.  ADS allows someone to implant information, 
whether maliciously or not, into a file that cannot be 
detected by normal means.  These additions do not alter the 
properties of the file that is acting as the "carrier" of 
these streams.  Neither the size nor the display of the 
file is modified.  The information concerning the stream is 
stored in the $MFT and its mirror which cannot be read 
while the computer is up and running.  Students should be 
instructed in the following areas:
● Determining that a hard drive has been formatted using 
NTFS.




● What to do if an ADS is found
■ Viewing and documenting the contents of the ADS
File Header/Signature Rectification
A technique commonly used to hide a file's true file 
type or contents in Windows is to change a file's 
extension.  Windows unfortunately reads a file's three 
character extension to determine which program to use to 
view/edit the file.  Simply changing this extension is 
enough to confuse the operating system.  Students should 
learn:
● How to manually search file headers/signatures
■ Using hex editors
■ Comparing a file's header with a known good list 
of file headers
■ Using the Linux command file
● Automated signature rectification using main analysis 
tool
File Recovery/Data Carving
Most people are under the mistaken impression that 
when they delete a file that it is removed physically from 
the disk.  These same people also believe that when a hard 
drive or floppy disk is reformatted that all the prior 
information is also gone.  In this section, the students 
need to be trained in the knowledge that this simply is not 
true and deleted files can be recovered in most cases. 
Concepts for the students to learn:
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● What is data carving?
● How data carving is useful in our investigations.
● In which situations a file would not be recoverable
■ Overwriting with new files
■ Data destruction via tools created for that 
purpose
■ Physical disk destruction
● Recovery via Electron Microscope (and how that is 
beyond the scope of the course)




■ Host Protected Area
■ Unused Disk Space
● How to extract the contents of these areas
● How to carve files
■ What tools are available
■ Updating file signatures
■ How the tools work
● Recovering, Restoring, and Renaming carved files
Image Processing
With image processing, the students need to learn that 
all images are not what they seem.  They need to learn 
about methodically performing a visual inspection of files 
and what steganography is.  Topics to cover include:
● Viewing and cataloging images
● Determining the content of images
● Steganography
■ What is steganography?
■ How is it used?
■ How steganography differs from cryptography
■ Commonly available steganography tools
● Using tools to determine if files contain 
steganography
■ Using the tools that create stego files
■ Stegdetect tool
■ Stegbreak tool
● Extracting steganographic information
● Even though steganography is commonly associated with 
image files, explain how other files can contain 
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steganography.  Give examples.
Keyword Searching
A fairly easy way to find information rather quickly 
is to perform a keyword search.  When contracting out to a 
client, the client may provide a list of keywords to search 
for in the filesystem.  If not, you can easily create a 
personal list of keywords on a case-by-case situation.  By 
interacting with the client, you can usually determine what 
information to search for.  Students should learn:
● The purpose of keyword searching
● How to create a keyword list if not provided one
■ Exact words or phrases
■ Wildcard usage
● Using wildcards to search for email
● What tools to use to keyword search
● How to interpret results
Report Writing
Upon completion of the forensics analysis, a report 
must be written detailing the findings of the examination. 
Emphasis upon good grammar, clean formatting, and clear 
presentation of facts and conclusions must be imparted to 
the students.  They need to learn:
● What should be included in the final report.
● What should NOT be included in the final report.
● Report formatting (all from [NIJ, 29-30])
■ Identity of the reporting agency.
■ Case identifier or submission number.
■ Case investigator.
■ Identity of the submitter.
■ Date of receipt.
■ Date of report.
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■ Descriptive list of items submitted for 
examination, including serial number, make, and 
model.
■ Identity and signature of the examiner.
■ Brief description of steps taken during 
examination, such as string searches, graphics 
image searches, and recovering erased files.
■ Results/conclusions.
■ Summary of findings
■ Details of findings
● Specific files related to the request.
● Other files, including deleted files, that 
support the findings.
● String searches, keyword searches, and text 
string searches.
● Internet-related evidence, such as Web site 
traffic analysis, chat logs, cache files, e-
mail, and news group activity.
● Graphic image analysis.
● Indicators of ownership, which could include 
program registration data.
● Data analysis.
● Description of relevant programs on the 
examined items.
● Techniques used to hide or mask data, such as 
encryption, steganography, hidden attributes, 
hidden partitions, and file name anomalies.
■ Supporting materials
● List supporting materials that are included 
with the report, such as printouts of 
particular items of evidence, digital copies of 
evidence, and chain of custody documentation.
■ Glossary
This methodology should serve the students well.  It 
should be equivalent to a private forensics training 
course.  The labs in the appendices should amply complement 




Computer Forensics is a field of Information Security 
that will be necessary to study and improve for many years 
to come.  Universities will need to train and prepare 
graduate-level students with the necessary skills to be a 
competent forensics analyst upon achievement of his or her 
degree.  The most effective methods of teaching computer 
forensics have been laid out in this thesis.  If 
universities choose to implement the laboratory curricula 
presented, it will greatly benefit students who wish to 
learn computer forensics and wish to become a successful 
computer forensics analyst.
In this section of the thesis, we will discuss two 
major topics:  the major shortcomings of this thesis and 
how this work could eventually be expanded.  Actually, 
these two topics complement each other as the major 
shortcomings of this thesis would be the proper avenues to 
explore to expand this work.  
The scope of this thesis is the greatest limitation 
placed upon its writing.  When I first began researching 
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this topic, I was full of ideas that I wanted to include in 
my writings.  Compiling the list of the topics I wanted to 
touch on would have created an outline suitable for a mass 
publication literary work.  Unfortunately, I had neither 
the time nor the patience to write a tome of that 
magnitude.  With the help of Dr. Elmaghraby, I was able to 
pare down my thoughts and ideas into a form actually 
smaller that what is listed in my outline.  This trimming 
and rearranging helped focus me onto hard drive and similar 
media forensics.  It was at this point that I realized that 
there was a glaring omission.  I had neglected to include a 
section specifically dedicated to the methodology I was to 
prescribe.  I originally believed it would be enough to 
have a literature review and a laboratory section alone. 
After much pondering, I decided a methodology section was 
in order to explain why I chose to create the lab portion 
as I did.  As this is the seventh instance of my thesis, 
the methodology did not appear until the fifth writing. 
Thus, we can begin determining how this work can be 
expanded by first revisiting the thesis scope.
In shortened form, this thesis is to cover techniques 
directly concerning performing a computer forensics 
analysis of a hard drive or other related media.  This is 
where expansion upon this topic can begin.  The first place 
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where expansion can be beneficial is to focus on the 
forensic examinations of specific operating systems.  Since 
this thesis is for the most part operating system neutral, 
the first action I would take is created three sections 
dedicated solely to the three major operating systems:  the 
Microsoft Windows family, the UNIX/Linux family, and the 
Apple OS families (even though Apple OS X could conceivably 
be placed in the UNIX/Linux family).  I would then further 
break down the sections into subparts.  In the Microsoft 
Windows section, I would rend it into the Windows 9x family 
and the Windows NT family.  For Apple OS, it would be split 
into pre-OS X and OS X families.  For UNIX/Linux, it would 
be tricky.  I would have a section with generalizations of 
each the commonalities between the different distributions 
and another section with the portions that pertain to the 
specifics of the distributions.  I would want to at least 
cover AIX, HPUX, IRIX, SCO, Solaris, BSD and the Linux 
distributions Red Hat, SuSE, Debian, and Slackware.  
The next avenue to explore in further expanding this 
thesis is live analysis.  Since this thesis focuses 
exclusively on performing forensic analyses of systems that 
are no longer running, branching into live analysis is 
logical.  A live analysis is one in which the suspect 
computer system is currently in operating mode with 
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processes running.  A live analysis is rather tricky to 
perform as data is changing in real time and crucial 
information may be destroyed.  There are programs available 
on the market to perform a live analysis, such as Guidance 
Software's EnCase Enterprise Edition, but these require 
installation, activation, and processes running long before 
a live analysis is performed.
A third avenue to explore is network forensics. 
Network forensics is the capture, recording, and analysis 
of network events in order to discover the source of 
security attacks or other problem incidents 
[SearchSecurity].  The requirements for storage of this 
information is astronomical given the speed and volume of 
data that flows through the Internet or common networks. 
Some of this may be accomplished by creating a honeypot for 
attack, but usually not enough information is gathered from 
one machine.  Therefore, the time and effort involved can 
outweigh the benefits.  But, this is still a viable topic 
to be examined.
Finally, the field of software forensics is another 
avenue in which to explore expanding this thesis.  Although 
a distinct tangent from the scope of the thesis, it still 
merits mentioning here.  The goal of software forensics is 
not to examine a system to determine if crimes have been 
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committed or gather information for a legal brief; it is to 
examine a piece of malware and determine who wrote the 
software in an attempt to capture them.  You can learn how 
the malware was written, how it works, its purpose, and 
hopefully the author by using established software 
forensics methods.  
I believe these topics are good starting points for 
expansion upon this thesis.
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APPENDIX A:  LABORATORY PRAXIS
PREFACE:    Laboratory Equipment Requirements  
When creating a laboratory to perform a forensic 
analysis of a computer, two major factors come into play. 
The first factor is the money involved to purchase the 
needed equipment and software; the second is the actual 
computer and software needed to be purchased.  This section 
will focus on creating a small forensics lab on a minimal 
budget that will allow one to complete the following lab 
exercises and be a good entry-level setup if the student 
decides to continue into a career as an independent 
consultant.
The money factor will greatly influence the choice of 
equipment purchased but should not affect the choice of 
software purchased.  Since we should attempt to have 
standardized software, it will be assumed that we will need 
at least one primary forensics software package to perform 
standard analysis functions and one to perform the task of 
data carving.  For those on a very tight budget, I 
recommend purchasing Access Data's Forensic Toolkit® 
(US$1095 at time of writing) to perform the standard 
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analysis functions and the DataLifter® File Extractor Pro 
(US$155 at time of writing) to perform data carving 
functions.  FEPro is much more robust and allows for 
creation of custom signatures to carve with than the built-
in data carving tool of Forensic Toolkit®.  For those with 
a larger budget, I recommend purchasing Guidance Software's 
EnCase® Forensic Edition (Price unknown at the time due to 
the company not publishing prices anymore.  Assumed to be 
in the US$2500-$3000 range per personal license.) along 
with the DataLifter® Forensicware SolutionsTM (US$335 at 
time of writing) and Paraben's P2 Power Pack (US$1495 at 
time of writing) which contains a whole host of tools that 
makes an investigation easier such as encryption cracking 
tools and chat analyzers.
As for the hardware required for a forensics analysis, 
a powerful PC is necessary that has the capability to 
interface with the three major types of hard drives (SATA, 
SCSI, and IDE) with write-blocking capability.  Also 
necessary is the ability to read DVD/CD discs, floppy 
disks, and various flash media and thumb drives.  The 
necessity to read these media types in a read-only manner 
cannot be stated enough.  Therefore, the options are 
limited to either purchasing a computer forensics specific 
machine or purpose-building one yourself.  For off-the-
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shelf machines, there are at least three manufacturers 
building forensics-specific machines.  One is Forensic 
Computer (http://www.forensic-computers.com) of Glen Lyn, 
VA.  Their baseline product, the Original Forensic Tower II 
(US$4990 base price at time of writing) is available as a 
beginner's forensic computer.  Another company is Digital 
Intelligence (http://www.digitalintelligence.com) of 
Waukesha, WI.  Their baseline product, F.R.E.D. (US$5999 
base price at time of writing) is also a good starter 
computer.  Finally, ForensicPC (http://www.forensicpc.com) 
which is a subsidiary of Axis Microsystems, Inc. of 
Medford, MA offers the entry-level ForensicPC Pentium D 
Tower (US$3495 base price at time of writing).  
I am of the opinion that a computer that is purpose-
built may actually be more powerful than what is 
commercially available for an equivalent price.  My 
personal recommendations of minimum requirements would be:
● AMD Opteron Dual-Core Processors (at least one, 
preferably two)
● 2GB RAM (more is better, but Windows XP cannot address 
more than 4GB)
● At least 200GB internal SATA storage (for OS and tools)
● Removable drive bays to house forensic copies of 
evidentiary hard drives for examination purposes 
(writable for cloning, read-only for investigation)
● Hardware write-blockers capable of interfacing with 
SATA, SCSI, and IDE
● DVD/RW drive for saving information
● DVD-ROM drive for accessing information on DVD/CD discs
● Floppy Drive
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● PCMCIA/Media Card reader (read-only)
● Plenty of USB 2.0 and Firewire ports
● Sound card
● Windows-based Operating System (Linux as an additive 
option)
I recommend the AMD processors versus the Intel processors 
by personal choice.  It is my opinion that the AMD 
processors are better on the whole.  I shall attempt to 
clarify my opinion with the following analogy from the 
automotive world:  the Intel processors have more 
horsepower whereas the AMD processors have more torque. 
It's great to go fast (horsepower) but fast is not a big 
help when severe number-crunching is necessary (torque) and 
your forensics machine needs all available power when 
performing an analysis.  Therefore, I would choose AMD 
products over Intel.
Everything written in this section prior has been 
mostly my personal opinion.  The following laboratory 
exercises have been written to make use of the equipment 
already available to the student at the university.  The 
University of Louisville is in possession of an older-model 
F.R.E.D. unit from Digital Intelligence.  This unit is 
equipped with  Guidance Software's EnCase® Forensic 
Edition, Digital Intelligence's DriveSpy, Image, PDWipe, 
PDBlock, and PART, and  DataLifter® Forensicware 
SolutionsTM.  Another important tool included with FRED is 
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FTK Imager.  It will be very necessary in the first section 
of labs.  Other software that may be used will be outlined 
in the labs with locations on the Internet where students 
may download them as necessary.
Forensic Imaging Lab
Forensic Sanitizing of Target Media
Purpose:
To acquaint students with the rudimentary forensic task of 
wiping media.
Objectives:
By the end of the lab, the students should be able to:
● Forensically sanitize media
● Familiarize themselves with F.R.E.D.
Key Concepts:
● Forensic Sanitizing
Materials Students Need to Supply:
● Floppy Disk (DSHD) or blank CD-ROM
Introduction:
Our first task before ever entertaining the thought of 
creating a forensically sound image is to ensure the media 
onto which we place an image or perform a bit-stream 
duplication has been made forensically clean.  I prefer 
using new media every time, but for our purposes and for 
training purposes we need to learn how to sanitize target 
media.  To do so, we need to make our hard drives conform 
to the U.S. Department of Defense Standard 5220.22-M/NISPOM 
8-306.  To roughly paraphrase this standard, all target 
media must have all addressable locations overwritten with 
a character (usually 0x01), its complement (usually 0x10), 
and then a random character.  This overwrite result must 
then be verified.  EnCase makes this very easy for us. 
87
However, I want us to have the capability to use non-GUI, 
non-Guidance Software tools.  After some research, I have 
found what seems to be a decent tool called Darik's Boot 
and Nuke (DBAN) at http://dban.sourceforge.net.  Although 
it claims to be able to wipe in accordance with the DOD 
specifications, it cannot wipe the Host Protected Area 
(HPA) of a disk.  But, it seems to be a good tool and I 
have read many good reviews of it.  Therefore, we will use 
it in this lab.
Methodology:
Instructions for wiping HDD to DOD specifications using 
EnCase:
1. When the power to F.R.E.D. is turned OFF, replace the 
HDD drive tray marked "Secondary IDE" with another 
drive tray containing your target hard drive (THD) 
which you wish to wipe.
2. Power up F.R.E.D. and login to Windows XP.
3. Start EnCase by double-clicking the EnCase icon on the 
desktop.  Please make sure the red key-fob is still 
plugged into a USB port at the rear of the machine. 
It will be lit-up if so.  EnCase will not work 
properly without the key-fob.
4. Click on Tools -> Wipe Drive
5. Click in the box next to #1 Local Drives (which places 
a check mark in it).  This will instruct EnCase to 
only search local devices and not any you may have 
connected to through a crossover cable or other 
network device.  Click Next.  It will then search 
F.R.E.D. for his local devices.
6. In the Choose Devices window, you will find many 
choices of drives and/or devices to choose.  EnCase 
has icons for partitions and icons for entire physical 
disks.  The icons for partitions are represented by a 
"clip art" representation of a hard drive.  THIS IS 
NOT WHAT WE WANT.  We do not want to destroy the 
contents of a partition; we want to wipe an entire 
physical medium.  The icon for a physical device could 
possibly be described as a yellow disk platter with a 
read/write head attached.  The one we are looking for 
is usually #11 in the list.  It should show the hard 
disk's label, number of sectors, and size.  We want to 
make sure we do not choose incorrectly, so please make 
sure you are choosing the correct one.  Know in 
advance the size of the drive you are wiping.  This 
helps a lot and can keep you from wiping a device you 
88
did not intend to.  When you have made the decision of 
which device to wipe, click on the box next to the 
device (which places a check mark in it) and click 
Next.
7. The choice of Verify Wiped Sectors is already chosen 
for us.  Please do not uncheck it.  EnCase then asks 
you to enter a hex character for it to write to the 
disk.  0x00 is the default.  Change the value to 0x01. 
Click Finish.
8. At this point, a new window will pop up and ask 
(roughly) if you are sure you wish to wipe this disk. 
You are then required to type the word "Yes" in the 
provided box.  Do so now and click OK.
9. Depending on the rotational speed of the THD, this 
process will take anywhere from 5-15 minutes per 
gigabyte of hard drive space you are wiping and 
verifying.  Since this is a labor intensive process, 
you may want to go do something else at this point.
10.Success!  When finished, you should be presented with 
a window showing results and verification.  If you 
were doing this for a case, you would click in the box 
to note the information for the case.
11.Now, repeat steps 4-10 but substitute a value of 0x10 
for 0x01 in step seven.
12.Now, repeat steps 4-10 again but substitute a random 
hex value in step seven.
13.When Step 12 is completed, you have successfully 
completed three of the seven passes required to make a 
medium security-level wipe in accordance with DOD 
specifications.  I will not torture you by requiring 
you to do seven passes.  You have successfully 
completed Task #1 when you verify the disk is empty.
Instructions for wiping HDD to DOD specifications using 
DBAN:
To use DBAN, you do not need to use F.R.E.D.  I recommend 
just using one of the three available machines in the lab 
with the drive trays in them.
1. Install THD in one of the removable drive trays of the 
available machines.  I have left a screwdriver set in 
the lab for this purpose.  You do not need to screw 
the THD into place, but you may need to remove a hard 
drive from the tray that is screwed in place.
2. Place THD tray into top slot and power on machine.  As 
the machine is booting, insert floppy or CD-R 
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containing DBAN-1.0.6 to allow the computer to boot 
from disk.  If you boot from CD, you will need a 
formatted floppy in the drive to store the 
verification file it will output when finished. 
3. When the initial DBAN boot screen appears, just press 
the Enter key and allow it to commence booting.
4. Once booting has completed, you will be presented with 
the DBAN screen (which is white text on a blue 
background if you get something else for some unknown 
reason).  Here is where you will make your choices for 
wiping the drive.
5. Type the M key to choose the method of wiping.  You 
will be presented the possibilities.  Use the arrow 
keys or the J and K keys to move the arrow next to DoD 
5220-22.M and press the Enter key.  This chooses our 
DoD standard.
6. Type the V key to choose the method of verification. 
The default choice should be Verify Last Pass.  This 
is the choice we want as it will determine if the disk 
is clean only after the seventh pass, not after each 
pass.  Press the Enter key.
7. Press the Space Bar.  This selects which disk we 
choose to wipe.  If you have multiple disks showing on 
the screen, use the arrow keys or the J and K keys to 
move the arrow next to the disk you choose to wipe and 
then press the space bar.
8. Press the F10 key.  This begins the process of wiping 
the drive (without delay or verification as EnCase 
does.
9. Depending on the rotational speed and seek time of the 
THD, this process can last up to many hours (It took 
me slightly over two hours to wipe a 3GB HDD that I 
believe to be only 4200RPM).  As with the EnCase 
instructions, you may want to find something else to 
do during this time.
10.Success!  You will be presented with a finishing 
screen (white text on black background) asking you to 
insert a floppy disk to record log files and 
verification information.  You will need a blank, DOS 
formatted disk for this. The files will be in .tgz 
format (compressed tarball).  In Windows, you can use 
a program like WinRAR to unpack these files.  In 
Linux, you can just use the built-in command tar -zxvf 
with the package name.
You will need to turn in a print out of the verification 
logs from DBAN for part of your lab grade.
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WARNING:  There is a small but forgivable problem with 
DBAN.  After writing the log files, it goes into a 
continuous loop to rewrite them.  Just hit the reset button 
on the computer or just power off.
Hashing Images and Drives
Creating Bit-Stream Duplicates (The Quick and Dirty Method)
Creating Forensic Images
Purpose:
To acquaint students with the rudimentary forensic tasks of 
hashing and imaging.
Objectives:
By the end of the lab, the students should be able to:
● Compute MD5 and/or SHA-1 sums of images
● Create a forensic boot floppy
● Create duplicates using Symantec Ghost
● Create images using FTK Imager
● Create images using Paraben Forensic Replicator
Key Concepts:
● Hashing Images and Drives
● Creating Duplicates 
● Creating Images
Materials Students Need to Supply:
● Floppy Disk (DSHD)
Introduction:
Acquiring forensically sound images or duplicates of a 
hard drive is one of the most crucial tasks an forensic 
analyst must complete.  If the information on the Source 
Hard Drive (henceforth known as SHD) gets changed by one 
bit, it can throw an entire investigation into jeopardy. 
This is sometimes known as having “dirty information” or 
“dirty data” and a good defense attorney will have this 
evidence excluded from any legal action.  Therefore, you 
must make sure the information you are about to copy has 
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not been tampered with since it became a possession of the 
authorities.  Chain of Custody documentation is of utmost 
importance in this matter.
The question remains, how can we make a forensic image 
or duplicate of a SHD?  Many methods exist but there are 
generally two major categories:  Hardware-based 
imaging/duplicating and Software-based imaging/duplicating. 
Hardware-based imaging/duplication is performed by products 
such as the ICS Solo-3 family of products, Logicube 
Forensic MD5, and Digital Intelligence HardCopy.  These 
products can create duplicates rather rapidly and will 
print out (you usually provide the portable printer) hash 
values and other information about the SHD and the Target 
Hard Drive (henceforth known as THD).  These products make 
the process very easy and efficient, but they usually cost 
$1000 or more.  Most startup forensic analysts cannot 
afford this luxury so they rely on the other category, 
Software-based imaging/duplication.  This is the category 
we will focus on in this lab.  In this lab, we will 
practice hashing SHDs with commercially available products. 
We will also do a quick and dirty software-based 
duplication onto forensically clean THDs.  Finally, we will 
create forensic images using commercially available 
products.
NOTICE:  Make sure you have forensically wiped the THD you 
plan on using for Section C of this lab.  Refer to part (i) 
for methodology.  Also make sure the THD is the same size 
or larger than the SHD.
Methodology:
A.  How to Hash a Hard Drive Using EnCase:
1. With F.R.E.D. powered off, place the SHD into an empty 
drive tray, replace the cover, and insert into 
SCSIBlock tray.  Please make sure the SHD jumper is 
set to Cable Select or Master.
2. Power on F.R.E.D.
3. Allow Windows XP to boot and login by providing the 
CECS 694 account password.
4. Double-click on the EnCase icon on the desktop to 
start the program.
5. Click the NEW button below the File menu.  EnCase 
requires you to create a new case to acquire a drive. 
We really don't need to do this at this point, but we 
must.  So when information concerning Case Number, 
Examiner Name, etc. appear, just press Enter or click 
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FINISH.  I have some defaults listed that will meet 
our purposes.
6. Click File --> Add Device.  This allows us to choose 
which hard drive we want to hash.  
7. In the Add Device window, click in the checkbox next 
to Local Drives (checkbox #1) and click NEXT.  This 
process takes a few minutes as EnCase searches for all 
devices attached to F.R.E.D.
8. In the Choose Devices window, click in the checkbox 
next to the Physical Drive representing our SHD 
(usually Physical Drive #3; usually checkbox #16). 
Click NEXT.
9. In the Preview Devices window, we are to double check 
that this truly is the drive we want to acquire.  If 
so, click FINISH or press Enter.  It is now acquiring 
the drive.
10.We are now back to our original EnCase screen.  You 
will now see that our SHD is now listed below Case 1 
in the left hand window.  Click in the box next to our 
SHD in this window.  DO NOT click in the pentagon next 
to the box.  It has a different meaning.  We do not 
want this.
11.Notice how the screen has changed a bit.  This is just 
a text dump of the SHD contents.  Now click Edit --> 
Hash.  It will ask for start and end sectors.  The 
default is the entire drive.  This is what we want. 
Click OK or press Enter. This begins the hashing 
process.  It should take less than ten minutes for 
this process to finish.
12.SUCCESS!  You now have an output of the hashing in a 
conclusion window. Copy and paste all this information 
into some sort of text file and save it into the 
folder you have created for your team on the Q: drive 
and name it EnCaseHash.  
B.  How to Hash a Hard Drive Using Paraben Forensic 
Replicator:
1. Download and install Paraben Forensic Replicator demo 
version (http://www.paraben-
forensics.com/programs/replicatordemo.exe) if not 
already installed.
2. With F.R.E.D. powered off, place the SHD into an empty 
drive tray, replace the cover, and insert into 
SCSIBlock tray.  Please make sure the SHD jumper is 
set to Cable Select or Master.
3. Power on F.R.E.D.
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4. Allow Windows XP to boot and login by providing the 
CECS 694 account password.
5. Double-click on the Forensic Replicator icon on the 
desktop to start the program.
6. Click File --> Calculate Checksum of Physical Drive.  
7. You are presented with a new window which is the 
introductory window for checksum calculation.  Click 
NEXT.
8. We are now shown a scroll pane listing all physical 
drives the software finds (it is much quicker than 
EnCase).  Choose the disk representing the SHD 
(usually Disk #3).  Ensure that both checkboxes remain 
checked.  Click NEXT.
9. In the next window, we are asked if we wish to 
calculate a hash on the entire physical drive or just 
a few sectors.  The default choice is Process the full 
physical drive.  This is what we want.  Click NEXT.
10.The Report Wizard window is next.  We want to choose 
HTML File as our output and click the first three 
checkboxes to be placed in out output.  Click FINISH.
11.We are now confronted with a SAVE dialog.  Name the 
file PFRHash and save it in the folder you have 
created for your team on the Q: drive.  Click SAVE or 
press Enter.
12.This begins the hashing process.  It should take less 
than ten minutes to perform.
13.SUCCESS!  A dialog box appears on the screen 
containing the information saved in our HTML file.
C.  A Quick and Dirty Method to Create a Forensic Duplicate 
Using Symantec Ghost:
I call this a Quick and Dirty Method because it is the poor 
person's imaging with a minimum of programs and money.  The 
longest part is creating the forensic boot floppy.  Once 
done, you can use the Digital Intelligence program Image to 
create an executable image of the disk for future 
duplicates.  Unfortunately, this imaging method will not 
stand up in court, but in internal company investigations, 
it should work.  The hash value of the drive will be 
different of the THD than the SHD unless you have the exact 
same model THD as SHD with the exact same specifications. 
This does not really matter in internal investigations. 
However, you may want to make other images using other 
programs if the case could generate legal action of some 
sort.
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1. Power on F.R.E.D.  At the boot menu screen, use the 
arrow keys to choose MS-DOS 6.22 and press the Enter 
key when highlighted.
2. You will be presented with many different loading 
options and you can just allow the default to load. 
You will be asked approximately four further loading 
questions.  You can choose to answer No to all of them 
or allow the defaults to occur when the choices time 
out.
3. Now you are presented with a C:\> prompt.  Insert a 
DSHD (1.44MB) floppy disk into the A: drive.  At the 
prompt, type format a:/s.
4. The operating system will ask you to insert a disk 
into the A: drive.  Press the Enter key.  When it is 
finished formatting, give the disk the volume name of 
4N6BOOT.  You do not want to format another.
5. Now the fun begins.  Switch to the A: drive by typing 
A: at the C:\> prompt and press Enter.
6. At the A:\> prompt, type ATTRIB -R -H -S *.* and press 
Enter.  This removes read-only attributes, hidden 
attributes, and system attributes from all files. This 
is necessary for the next step.
7. Type dir at the prompt to show the files on the floppy 
disk.  Remove the drvspace.bin file typing DEL 
DRVSPACE.BIN.  This file is very bad!  It must go and 
sit in the penalty box where it will feel shame.  This 
file attempts to write to hard drives, so we do not 
want it.
8. You now need to copy two programs, Symantec Ghost and 
Digital Intelligence's PDBlock to the floppy.  At the 
A:\> prompt, type COPY C:\GHOST\GHOST.EXE . and press 
Enter (notice the dot after the space after EXE as it 
is crucial it is there).  When that process is 
finished, type COPY C:\DIGINTEL\PDBLOCK.EXE . (again 
notice the dot).  These two commands will copy the 
files you need onto the disk.
9. You now need to create a file on the floppy called 
config.sys by typing EDIT A:\CONFIG.SYS (yes, I know 
it's redundant but you can never be too sure) at the 
A:\> prompt.  This will open a nice blue screen for 
you to type in.  Add this singular line:  LASTDRIVE=Z 
and save and exit the file.  The purpose of this is to 
not confuse DOS if it finds a lot of devices.
10.Now you need to create another file on the floppy 
called autoexec.bat by typing at the prompt EDIT 
A:\AUTOEXEC.BAT .  This is a file that DOS reads in 
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the booting process to run programs on startup.  You 
need to make two entries.  On the first line, type 
A:\PDBLOCK.EXE 0 /NOMSG /NOBELL . This command will 
activate the PDBlock program which is a software write 
blocker.  The option 0 (zero) will protect only the 
first drive in the system.  The option /nomsg will not 
pop up a message on the screen every time a write is 
blocked.  The option /nobell will not sound the 
annoying little tone continuously when a write is 
blocked.  The second entry in autoexec.bat should be 
A:\GHOST.EXE -IR .  This automatically starts Ghost 
for us with the proper switch to make a forensic copy. 
Save and exit the file.
11.You must now wipe all free space on the floppy to make 
sure nothing can contaminate your system.  To do this, 
switch back the the C: drive by typing C: at the A:\> 
prompt and press Enter.  At the C:\> prompt, type 
DRIVESPY and press enter.  DriveSpy is a forensics 
program from Digital Intelligence that has many 
purposes including wiping disks.
12.When DriveSpy starts, it will give you a listing of 
hard drives and their associated information on the 
screen, as well as a SYS> prompt.  This is the first 
DriveSpy prompt.  Type DA and press Enter to switch to 
the floppy drive. You are now presented a listing of 
the partitions on the A: drive.  At the DA> prompt, 
type P1 and press Enter.  This will allow you to 
access the information stored on the floppy.
13.You are presented with information concerning what is 
stored on the disk and a new DAP1:\> prompt (DAP1 
stands for Drive A Partition 1).  At this prompt type 
WIPE /FREE and press Enter.  This will allow you to 
wipe the unallocated areas of the disk.  DriveSpy will 
ask you if you are positive you want to do this.  Type 
Y and the program begins.
14.When it is finished, DriveSpy will return to the 
DAP1:\> prompt.  Type EXIT here and press Enter.  You 
have exited DriveSpy and are back to your C:\> prompt.
15.SUCCESS!  You have you floppy disk ready to run an 
image.  
16.To create an image, connect the SHD to the IDE0 cable 
in a computer.  Make sure the jumper is set to Master. 
Connect a FORENSICALLY CLEAN THD to the IDE1 cable in 
the same machine.  Make sure the jumper on the THD is 
also set to Master.  
17.Power on the computer after placing your forensic boot 
floppy in the drive.
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18.Sit back and watch.  Wait for Ghost to begin.  Press 
Enter when prompted with OK buttons from Ghost.  It is 
just complaining like most Symantec products do.  
19.You should now see the Ghost main screen.  Press the 
right arrow twice (to choose Disk-to-Disk imaging) and 
press Enter.
20.You should see the SHD listed as Drive 0 and the THD 
listed as Drive 1.  You need to choose the SHD as the 
drive to image from (it is the default) by pressing 
Enter.
21.You need to choose the THD as the drive to image to 
(it is the default) by pressing Enter.
22.A new screen listing the choices you have made is now 
showing.  Press Enter.
23.Ghost will ask you if you are sure you want to do 
this.  Press the left arrow to our affirmation of 
starting and press Enter.  The process begins.
24.When Ghost is finished, it will ask you if you want to 
reboot or not.  We don't want to reboot, so choose not 
to.  Press the down arrow key until Quit is 
highlighted and press Enter.  You are now down.  Power 
off the machine.
25.To prove your imaging worked, place the THD into an 
empty drive tray and WITH F.R.E.D. POWERED OFF slide 
the drive into the SCSIBlock drive bay.  
26.Power on F.R.E.D.  If you see a new drive, SUCCESS! If 
not, retrace your steps to find what you did 
incorrectly.
D.  How to Create   a Forensic Image Using FTK Imager :
1. With F.R.E.D. powered off, place the SHD into an empty 
drive tray, replace the cover, and insert into 
SCSIBlock tray.  Please make sure the SHD jumper is 
set to Cable Select or Master.
2. Power on F.R.E.D.
3. Allow Windows XP to boot and login by providing the 
CECS 694 account password.
4. Click  Start --> Programs --> Forensic Tools (Demos) 
--> Access Data --> Forensic Toolkit --> FTK Imager
5. In FTK Imager, Click File --> Image Drive OR you can 
press Ctrl+I on the keyboard.
6. In the new pop-up window, click the radio button next 
to the work Physical.  This should change the values 
in the drop-down list.  From the drop-down list, 
choose Physical Drive 3 and click OK.
7. You are now presented the Export Disk Image window. 
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From the drop-down list, there are three choices.  Raw 
uncompressed (dd) format is a straight rip using the dd 
tool commonly found in X operating systems.  SMART 
(ew-compressed) is for creating an image for the SMART 
for Linux forensics tool created by ASR Data 
(www.asrdata.com/SMART).  The .E01 Image type is the 
native image type of EnCase.  This is the selection we 
wish to make (.E01).  Click NEXT.
8. You are next given the E01 Image options window.  In 
the Examiner Name text field, enter both students 
names.  In the Case Number text field, enter CECS 694 
Lab 2.  In the Notes text field, enter the value 
“Ripped using FTK Imager.”  You may leave the Evidence 
Number and Unique Description text fields blank. 
Click NEXT.
9. Now, the Image Destination window appears.  Change the 
destination to be the folder you created for your team 
on the Q: drive and change the filename to be FTK. 
Make sure the checkbox next to Perform an MD5 hash of 
the image remains checked.  Click NEXT.
10.In the Image Segment Size window, click the radio 
button next to Custom MB and a slider bar appears. 
Drag the slider full right until the value under the 
Segment Info heading is 1.0GB.  Click NEXT.
11.If the Summary window values are what you want them to 
be, click FINISH.  If not, click BACK to make changes 
or click CANCEL to start again.
12.The disk is now being exported.  It should not take 
more than ten minutes. 
13.SUCCESS!  You should have three files from the FTK 
Imager in your folder:  FTK.E01, FTK.E02, and FTK.txt. 
E.  How to Create a Forensic Image Using Paraben Forensic 
Replicator:
1. With F.R.E.D. powered off, place the SHD into an empty 
drive tray, replace the cover, and insert into 
SCSIBlock tray.  Please make sure the SHD jumper is 
set to Cable Select or Master.
2. Power on F.R.E.D.
3. Allow Windows XP to boot and login by providing the 
CECS 694 account password.
4. Double-click on the Forensic Replicator icon on the 
desktop.
5. In the Paraben Forensic Replicator, click File --> 
Create Physical drive image...
6. You are now presented with the Creating Physical drive 
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image wizard which will help walk you through creating 
an image.  Click NEXT.
7. In the Physical drive scroll box, click on the entry 
for the 4210920 KB - WDC AC14 300R entry (usually Disk 
3).  Make sure the two checkboxes below our selection 
remain checked.  Click NEXT.
8. You will now be prompted to enter a location and name 
for your image file. Choose the folder you created for 
your team on the Q: drive and name the image file PFR. 
Make sure you check the checkbox for Save in raw 
format. Click NEXT.
9. The next window is the Report Wizard window.  We want 
our report output to be nice and easy to read, so 
please click the radio button next to HTML File and 
check the first three checkboxes below.  These 
checkboxes will place Image Information, Time and Date 
of Acquisition, and Export Partition Structure 
information in the report.  Click FINISH.  You will 
then need to tell the program where to save your 
report.  Save it in the same directory as the image 
you are creating.
10.The disk is now being exported.  It should not take 
more than ten minutes. 
11.SUCCESS!  You will be presented with a pop-up window 
that lets you know that the image has been created 
successfully.  This window also contains data 
verification information. Click OK and you are 
finished.  You should have two files in your team 
directory, PFR.PFR and PFR.html.
Laboratory Assistant's Duties:
● Restore the dd image LabAiiImage.1  to a hard drive 
preferably 4GB in size but you may substitute one that 
is larger.  Please make sure it has been forensically 




To acquaint students with the basic skills of forensic 
analysis and build investigative skills.
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Objectives:
By the end of the lab, the students should be able to:
● Pursue a methodical searching of a hard drive
● Find obvious evidence on a hard drive
Key Concepts:
● Basic forensic analysis
● Finding obvious information
● Building investigative skills
Materials Students Need to Supply:
● Floppy Disk (DSHD) from Project A(ii)
Introduction:
One of the great mistakes many novice computer 
forensics analysts make is to jump right into using 
forensic analysis tools and miss the overall picture 
created by the suspect computer's working environment. 
This is why I propose making at bare minimum two working 
copies of each suspect media (more specifically, the hard 
drives).  One is for viewing the media out of context in a 
forensic environment.  The other is to view the media in 
the context of a working environment.  Many clues and 
pieces of evidence can be easily gathered just by booting 
up a forensic copy of the suspect system.  This allows the 
investigator to see the system as the user would, which can 
lead to surprising results.  
I believe it to be very necessary to view the suspect 
media in-context before viewing it in a forensic 
environment.  This allows us to determine many things such 
as if the suspect media is contaminated with malware that 
could have possibly caused our current investigation (such 
as spyware that downloads child pornography to a victim's 
machine), if the perpetrator attempted to destroy evidence, 
if electronic burglary tools are present and have been used 
illegally, if pirated software is installed or stored on a 
system, or if there are any blatant violations of company 
code of conduct or acceptable use policies in a corporate 
situation.  Many of these may not be easily seen in a 
forensic environment.  Whereas in an out-of-context 
environment a file or set of files may look suspicious, in 
context they could be perfectly normal and acceptable.
This project, unlike previous projects, will focus 
exclusively on viewing a suspect hard drive in a working 
computer context.  Therefore, neither F.R.E.D. nor any 
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forensic tools may be used for this project.  This will 
allow you to build your investigative skills and not have 
you rely on software that cannot think logically for 
itself.  I trust that you will accomplish this task in a 
methodical, efficient, and timely manner and you will have 
a respect for not relying solely on a computer to do your 
work for you.
NOTICE:  Make sure you have forensically wiped the THD you 
plan on using for this lab.  Refer to Lab A(i) for 
methodology.  Also make sure the THD is the same size or 
larger than the SHD.
Methodology:
In-context Investigation Skills (aka Finding the Obvious):
1.  Create a duplicate of the Source Hard Drive (SHD) using 
the Quick and Dirty Method from the previous project.  See 
Project A(ii) for methodology.  The only difference is we 
want to use the three machines with removable drive bays 
instead of the tear-down machine.  Remove SHD and put it 
back where it belongs.
2.  Place THD in the top bay of one of the computers and 
boot it.  The image was created on this machine so there 
should be no problems with it working correctly.
3.  Complete the scenario below and answer the questions to 
the fullest extent.  You will be graded in accordance of 
the evidentiary material you find and the completion of the 
questions.
Project Scenario:
Your consulting firm, Acme Consulting, has been contacted 
by Thurdsten Industries concerning a problem they are 
having with an employee of theirs...a Mr. William R. 
Rubeck.  It seems Mr. Rubeck has possibly been violating 
the company's written policy of acceptable use of its 
computer systems.  Unfortunately, Mr. Rubeck has placed 
some sort of password protection scheme into the BIOS of 
his corporate computer that will not allow it to boot 
without the correct password.  This is why your team has 
been brought in.  Your company has been tasked with seizing 
Mr. Rubeck's hard drive and imaging it for forensic 
analysis during non-business hours.  Thurdsten Industries 
is so confident of the guilt of Mr. Rubeck that they have 
not authorized a full forensics analysis.  They only want 
your company to produce any information that is visible in 
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a non-forensic environment so they can justify terminating 
the suspect's employment.  
Assumptions:  You are to assume that the seizing and 
imaging of the suspect drive has been accomplished by other 
members of the team.  You are also to assume that you have 
been presented with a forensic copy of the suspect hard 
drive and that all chain-of-custody forms have been 
appropriately begun and/or completed.  You are also to 
assume the basic components of a corporate acceptable use 
policy for computers (use your best judgment).
Questions to Answer:
1.  Is there sufficient evidence to terminate the 
employment of Mr. Rubeck?  If so, please list all pieces of 
evidence and their location in the filesystem (path from 
filesystem root).
2.  Is there sufficient evidence to launch a criminal 
complaint against Mr. Rubeck and have ordered a full 
forensic examination of his hard drive?  If so, please list 
all pieces of evidence, their location in the filesystem, 
and why you believe a criminal complaint need be sworn 
against Mr. Rubeck.
Answers to Questions:
1.  Yes.  Students are to list the paths and find the 
following:
● Pornographic images
● Pornographic web sites visited in cache
● Evidence eliminator program
● L0phtcrack
● Hack-tool Gencontrol disguised as Google Earth
● Apache web server
● Steganography tools and someone's Master's Thesis on 
steganography
● BitTorrent client
Let them know that short-hand is acceptable when referring 
to My Documents (no need for the full path in that case).  
Value of this question:  80 points
2.  Yes.  In building upon the students learning 
investigative techniques, they should have discovered not 
only the steganography tools but a program known as Easy 
Office.  In the mailer program of Easy Office, a sent email 
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should be found addressed to the organization known as 
NAMBLA (if the students do not know what this organization 
is, they may use their own time to look it up).  This email 
lets the webmaster know that the images are up on the 
suspect's web server.  Upon cursory glance, the images 
appear to be legitimate pictures of soccer players.  But 
using the students' new-found investigatory powers, they 
should recognize that the combination of steganography 
tools, seemingly legitimate images, and NAMBLA is not good. 
The student should then use to steganography tools to 
attempt to extract other files from the images on the 
Apache server.  The students should be able to extract from 
each image of a soccer player a file containing child 
pornography.  Unacceptable:  Even though some of the 
pornographic images found may have titles leading one to 
believe that the subject is under age, they are not the 
child pornography files they are supposed to find and no 
points are to be awarded if they do not find the hidden 
images.  Value of this question:  20 points
NOTE:  NO ACTUAL PORNOGRAPHIC IMAGES OR CHILD PORNOGRAPY IS 
USED IN THIS LAB.  THEY ARE MERELY IMAGES OF STICK FIGURES 
WITH THE WORDS “PORNOGRAPHY” OR “KIDDIE PORN”.
Laboratory Assistant's Duties:
● Restore the dd image LabBImage.1 to a hard drive 
preferably 4GB in size but you may substitute one that 
is larger.  Please make sure it has been forensically 
sanitized in advance of restoring the image.





To acquaint students with the intermediate technique of 
file header/signature rectification.
Objectives:
By the end of the lab, the students should be able to:
● Understand what file signatures are and their 
importance to describing a file.
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● Be able to identify a file type by its signature.
● Be able to rectify a file by its signature.
Key Concepts:
● Using hex editors
● Using EnCase to rectify file signatures
Materials Students Need to Supply:
● EnCase University Edition Academic Training CD
● A suitable Windows-based hex editor (UltraEdit32 is 
recommended)
Introduction:
A common way people try to hide files in any operating 
system (and especially in Microsoft variants) is to change 
the extension of a file in the hopes that anyone looking 
for specific information will overlook it.  As most of you 
should know, Windows is heavily reliant upon a file's three 
character extension to determine what type of file it is 
and with what program to access the file.  Fortunately for 
us, this does not actually change what type of file it 
really is; it only obscures its true identity to the naked 
eye.  
The question we then need to answer is how we go about 
finding which files have their extensions changed or 
obfuscated in an attempt to hide the true contents of a 
file.  This is completely different from steganography, 
which is hiding information or a file inside of another 
file.  This is just an attempt to mask a file of one data 
type as a file of another data type.
UNIX/Linux has a great utility built in that allows you 
to very quickly determine what is the data type of a file. 
This utility is file.  In X-based operating systems, a 
file's extension is not necessary for the kernel to 
determine what type of file it is and what program to use 
to access it.  Therefore, you find many files in these OSes 
that have no extension.  The kernel reads the inodes where 
a file's information is stored and determines the type of 
file.  The file utility is very easy to use:  file 
<filename>.  
Unfortunately, Windows does not have a utility such as 
this built-in.  We must find another method to determine if 
a file is legitimate or not.  There are two major avenues 
we can use to approach this.  The first method is to 
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manually determine the file type and rectify the extension 
(in Windows) using a hex editor.  The other way is to allow 
a program such as EnCase to perform an automated 
rectification of the files using its built in file 
signature lists.  For this lab, we are going to do both. 
We are first going to examine the contents of a file and 
specifically look for its signature.  We will also learn 
how easily information can be changed in a file and how 
Windows can be tricked into believing a file is what it is 
not.  We will also learn how to use EnCase to rectify files 
based upon their signatures (which should be one of the 
first steps an examiner should do when using EnCase).
Methodology:
YOU WILL NOT NEED TO USE F.R.E.D. FOR THESE EXERCISES. 
THEY CAN BE PERFORMED ON ANY MACHINE USING WINDOWS, A COPY 
OF THE ENCASE UNIVERSITY EDITION ACADEMIC TRAINING CD, AND 
A HEX EDITOR.
Hex Editor File Examination and Rectification:
1. Make sure you have a hex editor installed.  I 
recommend using UltraEdit32 (http://www.ultraedit.com) 
if you are using Windows.  It is a fine, inexpensive 
program that does so much more than just hex editing 
and as of the time of this writing, they have a full-
version demo free for 45 days.
2. Open MSPaint and create a file with anything in it.
3. Save this file as its default data type (.bmp) and 
place it in a location that is easy to reach (such as 
the Desktop).
4. Change the extension on the file from .bmp to 
something else (I used .doc for this).
5. Windows will ask you if you really want to do this as 
it could make the file unstable. Yes, this is what we 
want.
6. Notice how Windows now changes the icon to the 
datatype the system now thinks it is. Double-click the 
file to open it.  You should see nothing but junk (or 
so it seems...).
7. Now you know how Windows relies so heavily on the 
three character extension of a file.  We know the file 
is actually a bitmap, but Windows doesn't.  This is 
sufficient enough to fool Windows, but not the file 
utility of Unix/Linux.  Here's why:
8. Close the file and reopen it using your hex editor. 
You should see something similar to this:
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9. This proves that the file actually is a bitmap.  How? 
Start at offset 0x00.  0x00 is 42 which corresponds to 
the character B.  0x01 is 4D which corresponds to the 
character M.  This is the telltale sign that the file 
is a bitmap.  This is the file's signature.  All files 
have a file signature, usually within the first few 
characters of a file.  This is sometimes referred to 
as a file header.  Some files even have a file footer 
as part of its signature.  PDF files have an end-of-
file (EOF) footer as part of its signature.  This is 
conclusive evidence that Windows reads a file's 
extension and not its signature to determine the type 
of file.  For a list of some common file signatures, 
check out 
http://www.garykessler.net/library/file_sigs.html.
10.Now, let's get a bit crazy.  Change this file into a 
PDF file by not only changing the extension but by 
changing the signature.  Don't forget to add the 
appropriate footer.  In your report, you will need to 
turn in the hex code (appropriately cropped) of the 
bitmap file you created and its true conversion to 
PDF.  Also turn in your results of whether or not you 
got Adobe Acrobat Reader to open your converted bitmap 
file.
Answers:
The bitmap file they created should look something like 
this:





Make sure the %PDF is in the header and some variation of 
.%%EOF. is in the footer.
Adobe Acrobat Reader correctly recognizes it as a PDF file 
but cannot read it as the information stored within is but 
junk to the program.  AAR states that the PDF may have been 
corrupted.  If only the program knew...
File Signature Rectification Using EnCase:
Imaging having to look manually at each file on a target 
system.  It would take forever.  This is why we have 
automated tools to do this for us.  Luckily, EnCase has 
this function built in.  If you plan on purchasing or using 
a full version of EnCase, you will need to purchase a 
subscription to NIST's National Software Reference Library 
Special Database 28 which contains a quarterly updating of 
file signatures to import and update the signatures that 
come with EnCase.  You can purchase them (at the time of 
writing) at http://www.nist.gov/srd/nistsd28.htm.  
1. Make sure you have installed the EnCase University 
Edition Academic Training CD.
2. Unpack the Quantum evidence file to your Desktop or 
other handy location.
3. Start EnCase by double-clicking its icon on your 
Desktop.
4. Drag and drop the Quantum.E01 file into EnCase.  A 
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window should pop up asking you to supply the program 
with case information.  Do this and click Finish. 
Please wait until EnCase finished verifying the image 
before continuing to the next step.
5. Click the pentagon in the left-hand column next to 
Quantum and also click in the checkbox next to 
Quantum.  This should show approximately 13,000 items.
6. To do the signature rectification:  Near the top of 
the screen, you should find a button that says Search 
with a magnifying glass icon.  Press this button.  It 
should pop up a Search box.
7. Uncheck everything except Verify File Signatures. 
Click Start.
8. Within 30 seconds, it should show a completion box and 
list for you the number of file signature mismatches.  
Questions:
1. How many file signature mismatches were found?
2. A file with a .BMP extension was found to have a bad 
extension.  Determine what type of file EnCase found 
it to be and explain why EnCase believes it to not be 
a bitmap.
3. A file with a .JPG extension was found to have a bad 
extension.  EnCase has determined that the file is a 




2. It is a .JPG file.  The file header contains JFIF 
which is the signature for a .JPG file.
3. It is a .WAV file.  The file header contains RIFF and 
WAVEfmt which is the signature for a .WAV file.
To answer #2 and #3, the students should highlight the 
files once found and click on HEX on the bottom section's 
viewer instead of the default Picture button.  This will 
allow them to read the file's signature.  If they want, 
they can export the files themselves and use a stand-alone 
hex editor to view the files.
Laboratory Assistant's Duties:
None really.  Just make sure they have copies of what 





To acquaint students with the intermediate skill of keyword 
searching.
Objectives:
By the end of the lab, the students should be able to:
● Completely search an image for keywords.
Key Concepts:
● Searching for keywords in files and file fragments of 
evidentiary target media.
Materials Students Need to Supply:
● EnCase University Edition Academic Training CD
Introduction:
Most people would assume that keyword searching is a 
basic technique.  On the surface, it looks like you would 
just use a text editor or word processor and click Edit --> 
Find and enter the search string.  It's really not THAT 
easy.  First, you couldn't dump the entire contents of a 
hard drive into a word processor (including the unallocated 
space).  And second, word processor Find capabilities are 
limited to a single word or phrase at any given time. 
Neither of these are beneficial to us.  We must have the 
capability to search large volumes for lists of multiple 
keywords all at once.  Fortunately, most forensic 
examination software have this needed capability.
What, pray tell, are the keywords we are searching for? 
It changes on a case-by-case situation.  The person 
contracting you to perform an analysis may give you a list 
of keywords to look for or they may give you the 
circumstances surrounding the case and require you to come 
up with a keyword list.  Keywords can be names of people, 
places, slang words, drugs, sports teams, etc.  Virtually 
anything can be a keyword.  It's up to your or your client 
to determine what to look for.  This requires you to stay 
in contact with the stakeholders in the examination as 
requirements and keywords are susceptible to change.
In this lab, we have the choice of using two different 
programs that we have readily available.  We can use 
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Digital Intelligence's DriveSpy to perform keyword searches 
or we can use EnCase.  Since DriveSpy will only work on FAT 
filesystems and is purely CUI-based, we will opt to use 
EnCase.
Methodology:
1. Start EnCase by double-clicking its icon on your 
Desktop.
2. Drag and drop the Quantum.E01 file into EnCase.  A 
window should pop up asking you to supply the program 
with case information.  Do this and click Finish. 
Please wait until EnCase finished verifying the image 
before continuing to the next step.
3. Click the pentagon in the left-hand column next to 
Quantum and also click in the checkbox next to 
Quantum.  This should show approximately 13,000 items.
4. Click View --> Keywords.  This will show you the 
default list of keywords.  We want to add to this.
5. In the blank area of the top-right column, right-click 
and select Add Keyword List.  A new pop-up window 
should appear.
6. In the left hand column, add fifteen or so keywords 
you want to search for concerning the following themes 
(the longer the list, the longer the search time):
● Drugs (specifically slang terms for Kentucky's most 
well-known export and paraphernalia)
● Bombs and Explosives
● Cellular Phones
● Satan Worship 
● Hacking
7. Make sure to check Unicode as one of the choices as 
NTFS and Unix/Linux systems use Unicode as opposed to 
ASCII for text.  Click OK.
8. After you have clicked OK, you will notice new 
keywords in the list.  Make sure you checkmark the 
boxes next to each keyword before you search.
9. Near the top of the screen, you should find a button 
that says Search with a magnifying glass icon.  Press 
this button.  It should pop up a Search box.
10.This time, we want to uncheck Verify File Signatures 
and check Search Each File for Keywords, Search File 
Slack, and Undelete Files Before Searching.  EnCase 
should tell you that you have 16 or more keywords. 
This is because we are including searching for email 
and web addresses.  Click Start and wait for the 
onslaught.
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11.To keep track of what you are finding, click View --> 
Search Hits.  You will need to click on Refresh near 
the top of the screen to update the findings as the 
search progresses. A running total of how many keyword 
search hits is in the far lower right-hand corner of 
the program.  It also estimates how much longer the 
search will take.
12.You will need to turn in a list of the terms you 
searched for, the total number of search hits and the 
number of search hits for each keyword searched.
Answers:
The answers vary by the keyword list.  
Laboratory Assistant's Duties:
Make sure each student submits approximately 15 or more 
keywords, the total number of search hits, and the number 





To acquaint students with the advanced technique of data 
carving.
Objectives:
By the end of the lab, the students should be able to:
● Understand the concept of data carving
● Successfully data carve a suspect hard drive
Key Concepts:
● Data carving
Materials Students Need to Supply:
● None
Introduction:
Most people are under the impression that when they 
delete/remove a file from a computer that the file is gone 
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and no trace of it exists.  Most people also believe that 
when they reformat a computer's hard drive that all 
information on it has disappeared permanently. 
Unfortunately, this is not true in either case.  When 
someone deletes a file, the information of the file is 
still physically left on disk.  The change that most 
operating systems make is to remove the entry from the list 
of files (FAT or $MFT in Windows, Inode list for X-based 
operating systems).  All this does is remove the pointers 
to the file's physical location and the OS marks the 
clusters as free to be used again.  The original file on 
disk is not physically gone until the clusters where it 
resides is rewritten.  This can be done eventually (and 
automatically) by the operating system when it reallocates 
the space for other information or a person can use any 
number of commercially available products to write 
information onto these clusters in an attempt to destroy 
the information.  From experience, not all of these 
products do as well as they claim.  Many still leave large 
amounts of information on the disk.
There is good news, though.  We can successfully recover 
most of the deleted information using a technique called 
data carving.  In Lab C, you were introduced to the concept 
of file signatures.  These are the way that operating 
systems are supposed to be able to identify what a file's 
data type is and choose the appropriate program to open the 
file with.  You also learned that Microsoft operating 
systems rarely follow this method and prefer to look at a 
file's extension to determine what type of file it is.  In 
this lab, file signatures will be used to identify a file 
that has been deleted and hopefully recover it.  
A data carving program is based on a simple concept. 
When we data carve, we search three primary areas for 
files:  unallocated clusters, volume slack, and unused disk 
space.  We export these areas to disk and allow the carving 
program to go to work.  The carving program will search 
these areas for file signatures that it knows and “carve” a 
file out of that area.  It will stop carving when it either 
gets EOF information or until its upper limit of file size 
to carve is reached.  It is an inexact science.  Just a 
random set of characters that match a known file signature 
can be misconstrued by the program as the start of a file 
and it will carve out pure junk.  This leads to a lot of 
incomplete carvings and they will have a tendency to fill a 
hard drive rather quickly.  A carve of a 4GB drive's 
freespace has been known to produce over 100GB of worthless 
junk before the program crashed.  Therefore, when carving, 
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it is advantageous to constantly monitor the incomplete 
carves for partial information.  If no such information is 
found, it is best to delete the incomplete files before 
they get out of hand.
The tool we will use to do our data carving is  the 
DataLifter® File Extractor Pro.  We will use the previously 
used EnCase to extract our disk areas to carve.
Methodology:
1. Start EnCase and create a new case as outlined in Lab 
A(ii).
2. The Lab Assistant has provided you with an EnCase 
image called LabDi.E01.  Drag and drop this image file 
into your case.  Allow EnCase to verify the image 
before you continue.
3. Click on the pentagon symbol in the left-hand column 
next to the icon of a hard drive.  This expands the 
drive image to show all files.
4. After you scroll all the way to the bottom, you will 
notice three file names:  Volume Slack, Unallocated 
Clusters, and Unused Disk Area.  These are the three 
areas we want to carve.  Check the boxes next to these 
three files.
5. Click Edit --> Copy/UnErase.
6. Make sure the choices “All Selected Files” and 
“Separate Files” have been selected (by their radio 
buttons) and click Next.
7. In the Copy column, choose “Entire Physical File” and 
make sure the Character Mask remains “None.”  Click 
Next.
8. Choose the location on disk (your group folder 
F.R.E.D.'s auxiliary drive) where you wish to export 
these to and set “Split Files Above” to 4000 (it is 
easier to type this in than to use the arrow buttons). 
Click Finish.  This process takes about one and a half 
minutes.
9. SUCCESS!  You have now exported the files we want to 
data carve.  You will need EnCase to answer the bonus 
question.
10.Start File Extractor Pro by double-clicking the icon 
on the desktop.
11.If FEPro throws up an error stating there is no disk 
in the drive, just continue to click “Continue” until 
it finally starts the program.
12.We now want to tell FEPro which types of files we want 
to carve.  We start in the left-hand column, “Common 
Headers.”  Make sure to choose all image files and 
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Internet files by clicking the pentagons next to the 
appropriate datatype headers.
13.In the center section, “Custom Headers”, choose the 
ones that are image and Internet related (roughly 25 
more signatures) by checking the boxes next to them. 
For this lab we are only concerned with images and 
Internet files.
14.Now click the Start button (blue triangle).  It may 
continue to throw an error at you but just continue 
clicking “Continue.”  You should now see the File 
Selection Wizard.
15.It is easier to carve one file at a time, so select “A 
Single File” and click Next.  
16.In this new screen, we will select the file we wish to 
carve.  Point FEPro to the Unallocated Clusters file 
on disk that you carved.  Click Next.
17.On this new screen, you will need to choose a location 
to store what you have carved. Point it to a location 
in your group's folder on F.R.E.D.'s auxiliary drive. 
HINT:  Make sure your location has a trailing 
backslash ( \ ) at the end or FEPro won't put your 
carved files in the proper location.  This is a 
feature, not a bug ;) .  Click Next.
18.FEPro will present you with a warning.  Click Continue 
to start the carving process. Make sure you monitor 
the output for the incomplete files to get out of 
hand.  Delete all unnecessary files.
19.When finished, it will display a small report and 
throw more of the same error.  This is fine.
20.SUCCESS!  You have successfully raised files from the 
dead.  Now, answer the following questions:
Questions:
1. What is the main theme of the user's Internet surfing 
and image collection?
2. BONUS QUESTION:  NO POINTS INVOLVED, JUST BRAGGING 
RIGHTS.  What operating system (exact version) is the 
image you imported into EnCase?
Answers:
1. Marijuana
2. Windows 2000 (FAT File System + WINNT folder = Win2K 
FAT + Windows folder = WinXP or Win9x)
114
Laboratory Assistant's Duties:
● Provide the students with a copy of the LabDiImage.E01 
file for their usage.
● Grade students submissions and submit grades to 
professor.
NTFS Alternate Data Streams
Purpose:
To acquaint students with locating NTFS Alternate Data 
Streams.
Objectives:
By the end of the lab, the students should be able to:
● Know what Alternate Data Streams are in NTFS
● Detect NTFS Alternate Data Streams
Key Concepts:
● NTFS Alternate Data Stream Detection
Materials Students Need to Supply:
● Floppy Disk (DSHD) from Project A(ii)
Introduction:
A very sneaky way that people can hide information in a 
Windows system that uses the NTFS file system is by using 
alternate data streams.  ADS allows someone to implant 
information, whether maliciously or not, into a file that 
cannot be detected by normal means.  These additions do not 
alter the properties of the file that is acting as the 
"carrier" of these streams.  Neither the size nor the 
display of the file is modified.  The information 
concerning the stream is stored in the $MFT and its mirror 
which cannot be read while the computer is up and running.
Why and when did Microsoft allow this ability in NTFS? 
Ever since NTFS has been available, the feature of ADS has 
been integrated into the filesystem.  Microsoft did this to 
allow for compatibility between NTFS and the Macintosh 
Hierarchical File System (HFS) [Zadjmool].  The modern 
incarnations of Microsoft's NT family products use ADS as a 
way to legitimately store information concerning files on 
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the system.
How can we protect against malicious usage of ADS?  There 
is not really much of a proactive approach we can take in 
this manner.  Streams can be easily created at a command 
prompt in Windows.  We must be reactive in nature.  We can 
find ADS using two basic methods.  The first is much 
longer.  If you copy the entire contents of a NTFS-based 
hard drive onto another hard drive that has been formatted 
with a variant of FAT, Microsoft will display a dialog box 
every time it encounters the copying of a stream.  At this 
point, you can choose to have the stream saved into a 
separate, visible file for later viewing or you can destroy 
the stream.  The second method is to use a tool 
specifically designed to look for ADS and identify them. 
This is the method we will pursue.
Methodology:
General Methodology Prior to Using Tools:
1. Create a duplicate of the Source Hard Drive (SHD) 
using the Quick and Dirty Method from the previous 
project.  See Project A(ii) for methodology.  The only 
difference is we want to use the three machines with 
removable drive bays instead of the tear-down machine. 
Remove SHD and put it back where it belongs.
2. MAKE SURE F.R.E.D. IS POWERED OFF FOR THIS STEP! 
Insert THD into an empty drive case and insert into 
SCSI Block drive bay.  
3. Power on F.R.E.D.
Directions for Using CrucialADS:
1. Download CrucialADS from 
http://www.crucialsecurity.com/products/index.html
2. Unpack the downloaded zip file.
3. Find where you unpacked the zip file to and enter that 
folder.
4. Double-click on the CrucialADS.exe file.
5. Select the drive that is representative of your THD.
6. Press Start.
7. When finished, record all found ADS and place the 
results in your lab report.
8. SUCCESS!
Directions for Using LADS:
1. Download LADS from http://www.heysoft.de/nt/lads.zip
2. Unpack the downloaded zip file directly to the C: 
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drive (this makes it much easier).
3. Open a command prompt.
4. Type cd \ at the prompt to make sure you are in the 
right location.
5. Type lads.exe /s /v <THD Drive Letter> to start lads. 
If you add  > lads.txt it will record all the results 
for you.  Example:  lads.exe /s /v c: > lads.txt
6. When finished, record all found ADS and place the 
results in your lab report.
7. SUCCESS!
Answers:
The students should find at least two ADS on the target 
system.  I believe the exact number should be three, though.
Laboratory Assistant's Duties:
● Restore the dd image LabDImage.1 to a hard drive 
preferably 4GB in size but you may substitute one that 
is larger.  Please make sure it has been forensically 
sanitized in advance of restoring the image.




THE SVENSYLVANIA HOOLIGAN BOMBING PLOT
The tiny island nation of Svensylvania is located in 
the Gulf of Bothnia between Sweden and Finland.  After many 
disputes with the government of King Sven LXXIII, the 
Svensylvanians declared their independence from Sweden in 
1922.  It is a peaceful country, except when soccer is 
involved.  The Svensylvanian hooligans are well-known 
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within European football circles as the fiercest, rowdiest, 
ugliest, and smelliest of them all.  
Svensylvania has never been known as a major 
footballing power.  In fact, until qualifying rounds for 
World Cup 2006, they had won only one international match. 
They defeated Germany 1-0 in their only prior meeting in 
1928.  Yet, for this World Cup they assembled the finest 
team ever seen on their shores.  They dispatched the Faroe 
Islands, Malta, and Liechtenstein in short order.  Their 
only loss was to World Cup 2006 hosts Germany.  All 
Svensylvania needed was a victory over Cyprus by two clear 
goals and a win by Germany over the Faroe Islands to 
achieve their hearts' desires.  Svensylvania easily 
defeated Cyprus 3-0 and awaited results from Munich.  Alas, 
the Germans were still bitter from their 1928 defeat to the 
Svennies and threw their match.  They lost shockingly 5-1 
to the Faroe Islands in which eight German players 
collapsed from heat exhaustion in the blazing hot 60 degree 
temperature.  This win by the Faroe Islands allowed them to 
steal qualification on goal differential from Svensylvania. 
An utter travesty had occurred.
The results outraged the entire Svensylvanian 
population.  Sven Karlssen of the Svensylvanians of Viking 
Ancestry Thugs (S.O.V.A.T.), the largest organized hooligan 
society in the country, released a communique hinting at a 
“dynamite” half-time show during the final in Berlin.  
Interpol has since been granted arrest warrants for all 
members of S.O.V.A.T. that leave the tiny island nation. 
After an anonymous tip traced to Canada, the arrest of a 
suspected leader of S.O.V.A.T. was recently effected in 
Vilnius, Lithuania.  Inside his so-called “safe house”, 
Interpol seized many of his personal items including his 
computer. 
The computer's hard drive has been entrusted to you, 
one of the world's foremost computer forensic analysts. 
You need to determine whether or not the rumors of a World 
Cup bombing plot are true.  If the rumors are false, this 
man will merely be deported back to Svensylvania.  If the 
rumors are true, Interpol may be able to round up all 
involved in this heinous plot and save the lives of 80,000 
innocent World Cup final spectators.  
METHODOLOGIES:  The skills learned in the previous labs 
will now culminate in this project.
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TOOLS:  All available tools at your disposal may be used.
Solutions to Lab:
Even though there may not appear to be much information on 
the hard drive, there is in fact much to find.  Obvious 
information found will be pictures of Berlin's Olympic 
Stadium, a map with Svensylvania on it, and a picture of 
the Svensylvania flag.  This is not incriminating evidence. 
But, combining this with the alternate data stream 
containing files explaining how to blow up the stadium, a 
file listing S.O.V.A.T. members and their worldwide 
locations,  and the following data-carved items:
● Videos and documents relating to explosives
● A video communique' revealing the “dynamite” half-time 
show
There should be sufficient circumstantial evidence of the 
plot and Interpol can round up all members of S.O.V.A.T.
Laboratory Assistant's Duties:
● Restore the dd image LabEImage.1 to a hard drive 
preferably 4GB in size but you may substitute one that 
is larger.  Please make sure it has been forensically 
sanitized in advance of restoring the image.
● Grade students' submissions and submit grades to 
professor.  Students must print contents of both 
alternate data stream files, list the files concerning 
the explosives, and correctly identify the name of the 
hooligan from the communique' video.  Partial credit 
is at the discretion of the grader.
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APPENDIX B:  Glossary of Terms
adware:  Any software package which automatically plays, 
displays, or downloads advertising material to a computer 
after the software is installed on it or while the 
application is being used. [Wiki]
alternate data streams:  1.  Additional data associated 
with a file system object that is not readily seen or 
easily accessed.  Commonly found in NTFS.  Also known as 
forks in UNIX.  2.  Newer area where nefarious users can 
hide data.  Similar to steganography in intention.
bit-stream duplicate:  1. A sequential copying of all of 
the bits on the media.  [USDEA]  2.  Transferring all 
information bit-by-bit from one hard drive to another 
without changing the information on the source drive.  3. 
A clone of a hard drive.
black-hat hacker:  Someone who breaks into a computer 
system to deface, destroy, or steal information.  May 
intend to use compromised system to launch attacks on other 
systems.
blue box:  An early phreaking tool, the blue box is an 
electronic device that simulates a telephone operator's 
dialing console. It functions by replicating the tones used 
to switch long-distance calls and using them to route the 
user's own call, bypassing the normal switching mechanism. 
[Wiki]
buffer overflow:  A programming error which may result in a 
memory access exception and program termination, or in the 
event of the user being malicious, a breach of system 
security.  [Wiki]
chain of custody:  The order in which a piece of criminal 
evidence should be handled by persons investigating a case, 
specif. the unbroken trail of accountability that ensures 
the physical security of samples, data, and records in a 
criminal investigation.  [Webster's New Millennium™ 
Dictionary of English]
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cyberharassment:  In Internet parlance, annoyance above and 
beyond what is considered tolerable.  Usually involves 
emails harassing a victim.
cybersquatting:  The practice of buying Internet domain 
names belonging to companies or famous people and then 
trying to sell them to said organizations for an 
unbelievable mark-up in price or just not allowing 
ownership of them by whom should have ownership rights.
cyberstalking:  The use of the Internet or other electronic 
means to stalk someone which may be a computer crime or 
harassment.  [Wiki]
computer forensics:  The science of acquiring, retrieving, 
preserving, and presenting data that has been processed 
electronically and stored on computer media. [Schweitzer, 
2]
data carving:  A process that uses a set of file headers 
and footers to search for data that meets the specified 
search pattern parameters. The term implies that 
information is “carved” out of the media being searched 
(implying it is somehow removed).  [USDEA]
data destruction:  The willful overwriting of data stored 
in a medium with other data, usually just random values.  A 
technique used by people wishing to cover their tracks 
after committing computer or computer-based crimes.
file header rectification:  The technique of searching a 
file forensically by its file headers to determine the 
actual data type of the file.  The file is then changed to 
its appropriate data type in the file system.  In Windows, 
this rectification is done by changing a file's three 
character extension.
forensic image:   An image is similar to a bit-stream 
duplicate in that it copies all bits from the source drive 
but differs in how it stores this information.  The imaging 
process creates a file (or multiple files) containing this 
information as opposed cloning a hard drive.
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forensic sanitizing:  A process that involves the 
overwriting of existing data storage locations (containing 
data) with a new pattern of zeros and ones.  Wipe software 
technology often wipes each storage location multiple times 
to ensure that none of the original data remains.  [USDEA]
gray-hat hacker:  A hacker who breaks into systems 
initially with only the intention to inform the owner of 
security holes but then crosses the line into black-hat 
hacking.
honeypot:  A trap set to detect, deflect or in some manner 
counteract attempts at unauthorized use of information 
systems. Generally it consists of a computer, data or a 
network site that appears to be part of a network but which 
is actually isolated and protected, and which seems to 
contain information or a resource that would be of value to 
attackers.  [Wiki]
intellectual property:  An umbrella term for various legal 
entitlements which attach to certain types of information, 
ideas, or other intangibles in their expressed form.  The 
holder of this legal entitlement is generally entitled to 
exercise various exclusive rights in relation to the 
subject matter of the IP. The term intellectual property 
reflects the idea that this subject matter is the product 
of the mind or the intellect, and that IP rights may be 
protected at law in the same way as any other form of 
property.  [Wiki]
image processing:  1.  In computer forensics, determining 
if an image (e.g. digital photograph) contains steganized 
information.  2.  Determining if an image has been altered 
from its original.
imaging:  The process of creating a forensic image.
keylogger:  A diagnostic used in software development that 
captures the user's keystrokes.  It can be useful to 
determine sources of error in computer systems.  Such 
systems are also highly useful for law enforcement and 
espionage—for instance, providing a means to obtain 
passwords or encryption keys and thus bypassing other 
security measures.  [Wiki]  Can also be hardware-based.
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keyword searching:  In a computer forensics examination, 
creating a list of terms and searching files or target 
media for these terms.
malware:  A generic term encompassing adware, keyloggers, 
spyware, Trojan horses, viruses, worms, and other nefarious 
pieces of software.
phishing:  A form of criminal activity using social 
engineering techniques. It is characterized by attempts to 
fraudulently acquire sensitive information, such as 
passwords and credit card details, by masquerading as a 
trustworthy person or business in an apparently official 
electronic communication. [Wiki]
phreaker (phreak):  One who engages in phreaking.
phreaking:  A slang term coined to describe the activity of 
a subculture of people who study, experiment with, or 
exploit telephones, the telephone company, and systems 
connected to or composing the Public Switched Telephone 
Network (PSTN) for the purposes of hobby or utility. 
[Wiki]
salami slicing technique:  The illegal practice of stealing 
money repeatedly in extremely small quantities, usually by 
taking advantage of rounding to the nearest cent (or other 
monetary unit) in financial transactions.  [Wiki]
social engineering:  The practice of obtaining confidential 
information by manipulation of legitimate users.  A social 
engineer will commonly use the telephone or Internet to 
trick people into revealing sensitive information or 
getting them to do something that is against typical 
policies.  [Wiki]
spam:  Unwanted email, usually in large volumes.
spyware:  A broad category of malicious software designed 
to intercept or take partial control of a computer's 
operation without the informed consent of that machine's 
owner or legitimate user.  [Wiki]
steganography:  The art and science of writing hidden 
messages in such a way that no one apart from the intended 
recipient knows of the existence of the message.  [Wiki]
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Trojan horse:  A malicious program that is disguised as or 
embedded within legitimate software. The term is derived 
from the classical myth of the Trojan Horse.  They may look 
useful or interesting (or at the very least harmless) to an 
unsuspecting user, but are actually harmful when executed. 
[Wiki]
virus:  A self-replicating computer program that spreads by 
inserting copies of itself into other executable code or 
documents.  [Wiki]
white-hat hacker:  A hacker who breaks into systems with 
only the intention to inform the owner of security holes.
wiping:  See forensic sanitizing
worm:  A self-replicating computer program similar to a 
computer virus.  A virus attaches itself to, and becomes 
part of, another executable program; however, a worm is 
self-contained and does not need to be part of another 
program to propagate itself.  [Wiki]
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APPENDIX C:  Laboratory Curricula of Less Merit
Microsoft FAT-Based Systems
This lab was originally planned to introduce the students 
to the FAT filesystem.  I initially believed it was 
important to include it in the main body of the thesis for 
the students to address during the term of a course.  What 
led to this belief was my many conversations with people 
who currently work as support technicians for many Internet 
Service Providers (ISPs).  These technicians informed me 
that many people still use Windows 9x family products and 
still need help configuring the systems for Internet usage. 
Because of the number of people still using these products 
and the people I have met who have upgraded from Windows 9x 
to Windows 2000/XP, I determined that it would be important 
to include a teaching/learning section dealing with FAT. 
Why I chose to remove this lab from the list of labs is 
that it would be so highly specific (pertaining only to 
FAT) as to distract from the broader topics that were more 
important to cover.  This lab would be a better fit in an 
intermediate to advanced level forensics course.  Since I 
was asked by my thesis advisor to only detail labs to be 
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used in a basic forensics course, the development of this 
lab was put on hold.  A rough outline of the lab assignment 
is as follows:
● Introduction to FAT





■ FAT Boot Record
■ Root Directory
■ Data Area
■ Primary and Secondary FAT
■ Cluster Allocation
■ Difference Between FAT16 and FAT32 Allocation
● FAT Exercises
■ What an Empty FAT Looks Like
■ How Files are Saved and Recorded Into the FAT
● Slack Space and Unallocated Space
■ File Deletion and Fragmentation
■ File Content Changes and How It Affects the FAT
■ How Easy It Is to Alter a FAT Entry
Windows NTFS-Based Systems
This lab was originally planned to introduce the students 
to the NTFS filesystem.  I initially believed it was 
important to include it in the main body of the thesis for 
the students to address during the term of a course.  Every 
Microsoft operating system released to the general public 
since 2000 (with the exception of Windows Me) uses NTFS as 
its default filesystem with FAT remaining an option.  Since 
Microsoft no longer supports the Windows 9x family of 
products, if users want to remain relatively secure in 
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their computing by receiving patches and security updates 
they will need to upgrade to Windows 2000/XP or the 
forthcoming Windows Vista.  Thus, it is important to cover 
the predominant filesystem used in the computing world. 
Why I chose to remove this lab from the list of labs is 
that it would be so highly specific (pertaining only to 
NTFS) as to distract from the broader topics that were more 
important to cover.  I did realize, though, that the 
alternate data streams found in NTFS were an important 
enough topic to merit space in the accepted laboratory 
praxis section.  This lab, as outlined, would be a better 
fit in an intermediate to advanced level forensics course. 
Since I was asked by my thesis advisor to only detail labs 
to be used in a basic forensics course, the development of 
this lab was put on hold.  The structure of the lab would 
have appeared similar to this:
● Introduction to NTFS


























■ Similarities Between FAT and NTFS
■ NTFS Attributes
● 0x10  STANDARD_INFORMATION
● 0x20  ATTRIBUTE_LIST
● 0x30  FILE_NAME
● 0x40  $OBJECT_ID
● 0x50  $SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR
● 0x60  $VOLUME_NAME
● 0x70  $VOLUME_INFORMATION
● 0x80  $DATA
● 0x90  $INDEX_ROOT
● 0xA0  $INDEX_ALLOCATION
● 0xB0  $BITMAP
● 0xC0  $REPARSE_POINT
● 0xD0  $EA_INFORMATION
● 0xE0  $EA
● 0x100 $LOGGED_UTILITY_STREAM
■ DUDS (Default Unnamed Data Streams)
■ Alternate Data Streams
● Exercises
■ Virtually Creating NTFS File Entries Into $MFT
■ Virtually Creating NTFS Alternate Data Streams in 
the $MFT
■ Deleting Files and How It Affects the $MFT
UNIX/Linux Forensics
This lab was originally planned to introduce the students 
to the UNIX/Linux forensics.  I initially believed it was 
important to include it in the main body of the thesis for 
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the students to address during the term of a course.  Linux 
is a popular alternative to Microsoft Windows and is a 
free/open-source implementation of the UNIX operating 
system.  UNIX/Linux can be commonly found installed on 
computers at universities, government research 
laboratories, and increasingly on home computers.  Its 
popularity extends from its speed and stability benefits 
over Microsoft products with the ability to create or 
modify Linux software.  It is believed that most web 
servers worldwide reside on UNIX/Linux systems.  The main 
disadvantage is its complexity in installing, using, and 
maintenance in comparison to Microsoft products.  Why I 
chose to remove this lab from the list of labs is that the 
majority of forensic analyses performed will be on 
computers with a Microsoft operating system.  Even though 
knowledge of UNIX/Linux forensics is very important, it 
would generally be considered outside the scope of this 
thesis.  Therefore, it has been relegated to Appendix B. 
This is an outline of what would have been developed:
● History of UNIX
■ 1969 – The Beginning
■ 1974 – The Great Rewrite
■ AT&T and BSD – The Great Split
■ Here Comes the Sun
● History of Linux
■ Richard Stallman and the Free Software Foundation
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■ The GNU Hurd
■ 1991 – The Linux Torvalds Kernel
■ The Open Source Revolution








■ Comparing/Contrasting the Filesystems

















● Exercises -> Never Developed
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